Helsinki
Quarterly
CITY OF HELSINKI URBAN FACTS
3/2013

HELSINKI
Dynamic and expanding metropolis

OPEN DATA
Apps give insights to local governance

GRAFFITI
Not just a subculture anymore

CITY OF HELSINKI URBAN FACTS ▶ HELSINKI QUARTERLY 3 / 2013

Contents

▶ **THE KALASATAMA DISTRICT** will be built into a model district of smart urban development, making use of open data and testing ideas together with the residents and those working in the area. –Photo: Jarmo Roiko-Jokela

EDITORIAL

HELSINKI in 2013 – recent trends and new developments

JARMO ROIKO-JOKELA

▶ **AN UNDERGROUND PIPE NETWORK, RÖÖRI,** will transport domestic waste in the new district of Jätkäsaari into a collecting station. There will be less garbage truck traffic, and the urban environment will remain hygienic and safe.

EDITORIAL

THERE IS A CONSTANT DEMAND FOR COMPREHENSIVE INFORMATION and knowledge in running and developing a city. It is important to have accurate, timely and relevant data, statistics and research available on a number of urban phenomena, as well as on new issues affecting cities.

The City of Helsinki Urban Facts is a city department whose main tasks are, on the one hand, to provide data, information and also a deeper understanding about topics of priority to the city; and to acquire insights into new trends and challenges facing the city, on the other.

Topics of statistics and research include population and demography, housing and environment, democracy and inclusion, welfare and services, urban culture, and economy and competitiveness. Small area statistics, neighbourhood statistics and geospatial analyses are at the core of activities at the City of Helsinki Urban Facts. Information on citizens' perceptions also increasingly forms a part of the research agenda.

Of vital importance in acquiring new insights and knowledge about cities and their functional urban regions is the close cooperation of Urban Facts with universities and research institutions in our region. Participation in comparative urban research contributes significantly to an understanding of the dynamics, opportunities and diversity that explain and inform the development of cities – across time, continents and cultures.

We are currently in the process of reviewing both the statistics and research programme of the City of Helsinki and the joint Metropolitan Region Urban and Research Programme. The updated City of Helsinki Statistics and Research Programme will take us through 2015. The Metropolitan Region Urban Research and Cooperation Programme (KatuMetro), in which Helsinki participates together with the other cities and universities of the region, as well as government ministries, is to enter a new phase as its current programme period comes to an end in 2014.

A third guiding document important to mention here is the new Helsinki City Strategy Programme, adopted by the City Council in April and embracing the term of the current council (2013–2016). The five priority areas, each containing a number of objectives endorsed by the City Council, are: wellbeing for all residents; dynamic city; liveable and functional city; well-balanced economy and good management; and innovations in the field of democracy and participation.

The implementation of the strategy programme also entails new demand for information and knowledge to assist the decision-making. For instance, welfare and health differences will be monitored more closely than before. Population projections, which are carried out annually by Urban Facts for Helsinki, its sub-districts and the metropolitan region, will increase in importance as the city strives to further improve the efficiency of its service provision.

ALA ARKKITEHDIT / HELSINGIN KAUPUNKISUUNNITTELUVIRASTO



▶ **KALASATAMA** will be a compact urban milieu close to the maritime nature. The residential project "Tropaion" will consist of five perimeter blocks of varying height covered with roof terraces on the top flats.

When strategies and programmes are prepared and implemented, the operational environment must be monitored closely. The main trends concerning the city of Helsinki and its operational environment include the following.

▶ **A GROWING POPULATION.** Helsinki and the Helsinki Region are growing. The city of Helsinki is growing particularly rapidly, with 100,000 new residents expected during the next 20 years. One factor explaining the growth is the fast pace in which Helsinki aims to construct new neighbourhoods – and also a considerable number of new homes – in the forthcoming years. At the same time, net in-migration from the rest of Finland has increased. In recent years the natural population growth has also remained at a relatively high level.

▶ **THE POPULATION STRUCTURE REMAINS YOUNG.** The number of children and young people is growing. The working age population is also growing, though the share is diminishing with time. The population is ageing, but not as fast as in Finland on the whole. The foreign-language population is growing and clustering geographically.

▶ **A LARGE NUMBER OF SMALL HOUSEHOLDS.** One-person households make up about half of all households in Helsinki. Single and two-person households account for almost 80 % of all households. Families with children represent about one fifth of all households. The share of lone-parent households is high.

ANTTINEN OIVA ARKKITEHDIT

▶ **WOOD CITY**, an eight-storey wooden urban quarter rising in Jätkäsaari, is to be the largest wood-built quarter of its type in Finland.

▶ **DIFFERENTIATION OF NEIGHBOURHOODS IS PART OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF MAJOR CITIES.** Helsinki and all Finland experienced in the early 1990s a recession that was the worst since the Second World War. Since then, socioeconomic differentiation and also spatial differences in terms of income, unemployment and education began to slightly grow. Sub-city level disparities are a part of the development of all major cities, but empirical findings indicate that these differences in Helsinki remain modest in international comparison.

▶ **RESIDENTS OF HELSINKI ARE SATISFIED WITH SOCIAL, HEALTH AND EDUCATIONAL SERVICES.** Helsinki's comprehensive and universally available services and well-functioning infrastructure have helped to keep the socioeconomic differences and spatial social differences at a modest level. Residents' satisfaction with the public services has been measured in national four-yearly Public Services Satisfaction Surveys since 1983. The findings of the 2012 survey in Helsinki indicate that service satisfaction has remained at a high level for two successive four-year periods and that changes in citizen satisfaction were noticeably smaller during the period 2009 through 2012 compared with the 2005 to 2008 period.

▶ **MUNICIPAL ECONOMY FACES CHALLENGES.** Uncertain economic conditions have persisted on all levels, while at the same time public services are more and more in demand. Developments in the population structure – the increasing numbers of children, on the one hand, and senior citizens, on the other – entail a growing need for specific services such as children´s day care, education and elderly services. The growing number and share of foreign-language population will also require efforts and support in terms of integration, including housing and education.

▶ **STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE ECONOMY.** As is typical for major cities, the industrial structure of Helsinki and its surrounding region is strongly service-dominated. A good four out of five employed workers are occupied in some part of the service sector. Economic growth has been fastest in financing and business services. The Helsinki region has a strong profile of private services, expert work and management, but Research and Development is also important and explains the performance to a great extent. Information sector jobs in Finland are strongly concentrated in the Helsinki region and particularly in the core of the region. Regarding the very recent development we may add that the number of jobs has increased, the labour market has remained attractive, and commuting is growing and expanding. The Helsinki–Tallinn cross-border region is important and evolving.

▶ **HELSINKI IS DEVELOPING AS AN OPEN AND ENGAGING CITY.** The City of Helsinki has invested considerably in developing open data in cooperation with the other cities in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area. Open data plays a major role in promoting civic participation, access to information and new forms of collaboration. The open data service titled Helsinki Region Infoshare (HRI; www.hri.fi) has been running since 2011. See Ville Meloni's article in the present issue of Helsinki Quarterly for a more detailed description of the HRI project and web service.

In international comparison, Helsinki resembles in many ways the other Baltic Sea metropolises. In about one third of the European regions, GDP per capita is higher than the EU average. Helsinki-Uusimaa ranks at 17 with a GDP per capita 1.5 times higher than the average. Hamburg and Stockholm belong to the top ten while Copenhagen ranks 19th. There is a clear positive correlation between the GDP per capita and population growth in the European regions. The regions with GDP per capita above the EU average tend to have a positive rate of total population change.

The employment rate (share employed of population aged 15 to 64) ranges from over 80 % in Swiss regions to around and below 40 % in Southern Italy. Many of the German, Dutch, Norwegian and Swedish regions belong to the top regions with respect to employment rate. Oslo and Stockholm both have 77 % of their working age population in employment while in the Capital Region in Denmark and in the Helsinki Region the share is 74 %.

According to the outcome of the Urban Audit Perception Surveys (2010 and 2013) carried out in 75 to 79 European cities, Helsinki residents are content with their city's cultural services and outdoor recreation opportunities. In the same survey, the residents of Helsinki also found their city and neighbourhoods safe and secure places to live. They are also fully satisfied with public transport services. Accordingly, Helsinki Region Transport (HSL) ranked on top for the third year running in the international BEST survey in 2013.

In various comparisons, Helsinki stands out to its advantage in terms of overall quality of life, safety, and functionality of public transport. In Monocle´s 2013 survey "The world's 25 best cities in terms of quality of life" Helsinki takes third position while Copenhagen is 1st, Melbourne 2nd, Tokyo 4th followed by Vienna, Zürich, Stockholm and Munich. In another liveability ranking, published by the Economist Intelligence Unit, Helsinki ranked 8th, with Melbourne, Vienna and Vancouver in the top three.

Dynamic and self-reflective city

Successful cities and regions appear to have the ability to generate and use innovation, to seize first mover advantages and to identify the key drivers of competitiveness and to adapt them to the changing environment. In Europe, cities and urban regions are crucial to national and European competitiveness. Although the international city comparisons cited above also identify some room for improvement and development, the results can be generally summed by stating that Helsinki is a good place to live.

Helsinki is one of the fastest growing metropolises in Europe. New areas for living and business are rising especially in areas formerly occupied by logistical and industrial functions. The recent construction of a new cargo port in the eastern suburbs has offered the opportunity to develop the inner-city site of the old port and railway yard area for other uses. In the forthcoming decades, Helsinki will expand faster than ever before, both by densification of old districts and creation of brand-new ones.

Many of the new residential areas will be attractive waterfront districts. Forward-looking planning solutions such as the largest wood-built urban quarter in Finland and the experiments with Smart City functions, together with strict quality requirements for construction, will contribute to a high quality urban living and sustainable urbanism in future's Helsinki. Helsinki uses data, information and expert knowledge in order to be able to reflect on its activities, successes and failures, and this self-reflective capability helps build an even better city.

— Asta Manninen | Director

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KEY FIGURES			
POPULATION (1 Jan 2013)	Helsinki	Helsinki Region	Finland
Population	603,968	1,383,993	5,426,674
% of the population of Finland	11.1	25.5	
Population projection 2030	705,657	1,636,109	5,847,678
HOUSING (2012)	Helsinki	Helsinki Metropolitan Area	Finland
Dwelling stock, number of dwellings	336,409	557,898	2,865,568
Completed dwellings	5,175	8,943	31,393
LABOUR MARKET (II/2013)	Helsinki	Helsinki Region	Finland
Number of employed persons	322,860	720,770	2,506,218
Change year-on-year, %	1.6	0.6	– 0.7
Employment rate, %	74.0	74.3	69.9
Unemployed persons	31,761	66,080	301,640
Unemployment rate, %	9.9	9.1	11.6
ECONOMY (II/2013)*		Helsinki Region	Finland
GNP per capita, 2010 (PPS, EU27 = 100)		159.1	114.0
GNP, change year-on-year, %		0.5	0.2
WELFARE SERVICES (II/2013)	Helsinki	Helsinki Metropolitan Area**	
Social assistance recipients	38,862	61,041	
Change year-on-year, %	8.5	9.8	
Housing allowance recipients	29,056	46,364	
Change year-on-year, %	8.1	9.0	
Library visits, Helsinki City Library (2012)	6,783,000		

* preliminary data
** excluding Kauniainen

HELSINKI: key trends in figures and charts



"Helsinki is one of the fastest growing metropolises in Europe. New areas for living and business are rising especially in areas formerly occupied by logistical and industrial functions."

HELSINKI IN 2013: RECENT TRENDS AND NEW DEVELOPMENTS

Population growth will focus in new districts



Figure 1. Population change in Helsinki by sub-district 2013–2023.



Figure 2. Population of Helsinki and Helsinki Region 1985–2013 and projection through 2050



Figure 3. Foreign-language population by district 2009–2012, proportion and change relative to city-level

Figure 4. Foreign nationals and foreign-language speakers in Helsinki 1985–2013



Immigrant population: increase and geographical clustering

HELSINKI IN 2013: RECENT TRENDS AND NEW DEVELOPMENTS

Economic structure is service-oriented



Figure 5. Specialisation of the economic structure of Helsinki in comparison to Finland, 2012.



Figure 6. Jobs by branch in Helsinki 2012.

Residents are satisfied with services and feel safe





Figure 7. Satisfaction with public transport in EU capitals.

Figure 8. "I feel safe in the city." Level of agreement in EU capitals.



PEKKA KAIKKONEN

A transparent city

IMAGINE A CITY where public decision-making is easy for all to follow and comment on using any digital channel. A solution to this challenge is being sought in Helsinki, which has long been working to unlock the data reserves related to municipal decision-making.

VILLE MELONI

In September 2013, more than 1,000 sets of data had been published in the Helsinki region as open data. Open data is meant for anyone to use as they wish, and it is in a form that is easily readable by computer software. Available are statistics, forecasts, geographical information, public transport timetables, historical aerial images, snow-plough monitoring data and much more.

Open data is used in many different online and mobile applications, as well as in visualisations and analyses. The best-known open data applications are different mobile applications that make public transport easier to use. A fine example of an application that uses open data is Blindsquare, which helps visually-impaired people to navigate in the city using their smartphone.

In Helsinki, one of the most important data openings this year has been an interface to the city's decision-making data, which contains information on the decisions that the city makes – in machine-readable form. This article focuses on the opportunities presented by the city's decision-making data and expectations for the future. The first part will shed light on the background to the opening of data in the Helsinki region, and will particularly provide information on the recent history of the unlocking of data to promote transparency.



▶ A screenshot of the open programming interface to the video recordings of City Council meetings.

SEPPO LAAKSO

▶ A meeting of the Helsinki City Council.



▶ A prototype user interface to Open Ahjo, allowing users to browse political decisions made by the City of Helsinki.

▶ The OpenSpending online tool is here used to visualize the City of Helsinki expenditures in 2009–2011.

A pioneer of open data

In 2009, a vision was created under the leadership of the City of Helsinki Urban Facts – a vision in which public data reserves would be produced and published as open data in machine-readable form for the free use of everyone. The vision was called Helsinki Region Infoshare (HRI). The projectisation of HRI was prepared through the co-operation of Forum Virium Helsinki and the municipalities in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area – Helsinki, Espoo, Vantaa and Kauniainen. The project's pilot phase began in summer 2010. This was the first major project in Finland with regard to open data, and the purpose was to produce operating models and good practices also for the use of others interested in opening up data.

In 2010, Finland was in the early stages in terms of opening data. As a concept, open data was familiar to a handful of people active in the field, but in public administration the idea was still new, with the exception of a few experiments. In HRI, the aim was to open up data as quickly as possible, and to offer a platform for finding this data, for example through open data catalogues or web services familiar in the UK and USA.

In March 2011, the first version of the www.hri.fi online service was published, through which not only hundreds of data sets were available, but also machine-readable interfaces to library collection catalogue data and public transport data. HRI had made the decision to promote the opening not only of statistical information but also any other type of public data. Soon the opening of data promoting the transparency of administration would also be underway.

Opening up the municipal economy

Open data provides many benefits. Many wish for new business and innovations to be created on the basis of such data. The streamlining of administration and co-operation between authorities is also seen as important, and here open data would appear to have a lot to offer. In the opinion of some, one of the key benefits of open data is the effect of promoting transparency in society and, as a result, civic participation and democracy.

Transparency in the public sector can be increased in many ways. In addition to statistical information, in the world of open data, one of the key developments increasing transparency in administration has been the publishing of financial statement information, budgets and even individual transactions as open data.

In May 2011, a meeting of the budget chiefs of the municipalities in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area was convened at Vantaa's request, in order to listen to a presentation by HRI about open financial data. The presentation focused, in particular, on some examples of British financial data from data.gov.uk, and the applications that make use of them, such as Openspending.org or Wheredoesmymoneygo.org. At the meeting, a consensus was reached that, with the assistance of HRI, the financial statement data of the Helsinki Metropolitan Area could be opened every year based on the British model.

Helsinki was first to open its financial statement data in December 2011 and soon after Vantaa followed suit at an even more detailed level than Helsinki. At present, open financial statement data is available from all municipalities in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area, and it will be interesting to see how different parties will apply it in future. For many in Finland, it is still a surprise that such detailed data about municipal finances is already available in machine-readable form, and thus diversely applicable and analysable with a variety of software.

Helsinki's and Vantaa's financial statement information can be browsed using the Openspending application, which helps people to concretely understand how much money is needed annually for the different functions of a specific school or day-care centre, for example. In Helsinki, open financial data has been utilised, for example, in open budgeting for the planning of the Central Library. In this case, the library's customers were given the chance to determine how a specific portion of the future library's budget should be used.

In Vantaa, open financial statement data has been found very useful also within the city administration, as it can be analysed using new tools, which offer, for example, an easier way than before to understand the operations of your own department. Vantaa's financial data has been used to make a computer game[1], in which the player's job is to knock down towers illustrating Vantaa's budget, and thereby learn to understand the scale of the budget of the City of Vantaa in an amusing way!

In Finland, opening up and utilising open financial data is still in its infancy. In order for it to be useful for citizens and, for example, journalists, its application needs new tools that would present data better in context. Media, for instance, would benefit from an application that would automatically produce a visualisation of any news item related to public services and their financing.

As a result of the process of opening up financial data, we have noticed that published financial data as such is not sufficient, but should work together with other data describing public sector activity in order to form a better overall picture.

What could we achieve by analysing on a map financial data broken down to the level of city service points; statistical data on the location and use of the service points; population statistics by district; and by adding information about the city decision-making and its history? In this way, public-sector work and the planning of municipal services would become easier to grasp, not only for residents but also for officials and decision-makers themselves.

Discussion on vegetarian food inspires a council video interface

In February 2010, a YouTube user published a video called "Helsinki City Council: Vegetarian Food Day." A weekly vegetarian food day suggested for schools caused a lively, at times emotional discussion in the council, and the debate was successfully edited into a speeded-up version in the video in question. The video attracted more than 100,000 views. It inspired the city to open an interface to video recordings of City Council meetings, so that videos of the proposals of councillors would be technically easier to compile and show online.

The first version of the "Council Video Interface", or open.helsinkikanava.fi, was published back in the summer of 2010. However, it was ahead of its time in the sense that there was, at start, very little understanding about how to properly utilise the opportunities it presented. The story goes that one media house said: "We don't understand anything about interfaces like this – do you have video tapes to give us?" This comment is understandable. In many media houses, technological expertise such as the application of data is still a challenge, even though skills have improved.

In skilled hands, a few hours' coding work with the interface can result, for example, in an application that visualises the councillors who have the most often exceeded their allotted speaking time. This light-hearted application, among others, was coded at the Wärk:fest makers' fair in 2012.

The council video interface has a great deal of unused potential. But what if all the city's decision-making matters were available through an open interface for the use of application developers and others interested?

1) http://www.hri.fi/fi/sovellukset/budget-fall

Technical existence of the city's case management

The Ahjo case management system is critical from a point of view of the City of Helsinki's decision-making. All decisions concerning the city are prepared through Ahjo, and it is estimated to have about 5,000 users from city councillors to officials.

Helsinki has one operating model for making official decisions. Many cases are decided upon in different committees and boards focusing on various fields of administration, but strategic and more important decisions are referred to the City Board or City Council. In accordance with the decision-making model, the life cycle of cases consists of four stages:

- **ACTIVATION**: Cases are brought into the system through the city authorities' joint registry office, which classifies them and gives them record numbers.
- **PREPARATION**: The authority or public utility responsible for the case prepares the decision proposal.
- **DECISION-MAKING**: The completed decision proposal is decided upon in the appropriate committee or board or in a higher administrative body. Depending on the case, it is also possible to delegate the power of decision to an individual official.
- **IMPLEMENTATION**

The decision-making of the city is based on written materials. When a case arises requiring a decision, it is entered into the system as a document and is given a unique record number. The system creates an XML format file containing several codes depicted in the record number fields.

A meeting's agenda may contain, say, a topic "Updated Helsingin Energia development programme for a carbon-neutral future," whose record number in long form is HEL 2011-007015 T 14 03 00. By means of this number, it is possible to find the board meeting of the municipal power utility Helsingin Energia where the same case was previously preliminarily dealt with. The records are thus key to understanding the decision-making between the City Board and the city departments and public utilities.

Ahjo contains data on, for example, the subjects of the meeting dealing with the case, the field of administration, keywords, cases proposed and decided upon, and geographical information concerning cases, the names of meeting attendees and much more. Through the data content of the records and Ahjo, it is thus possible to monitor and analyse the city's decision-making comprehensively.

In spring 2012, HRI organised the first workshop which, together with developers, considered how best to build an open interface for Ahjo. In this way, decision-making data would be available for the use of all interested developers. The workshop decided that, in the first stage, the easiest thing would be to publish on the Internet XML files containing decision document data behind a firewall, and to describe their content so that people applying it from outside the administration would also be able to use it.

The Ahjo system was still at an introductory stage in 2012, so the implementation of an open interface was not the first priority. Nevertheless, in due course the city took active steps to proceed with the interface project, and in March 2013 the first version of the Open Ahjo interface was published.

Electronic watchdogs for citizens

In Finland, voters have for years used voting advice applications (VAA) offered online by media companies. VAAs help citizens to find the most suitable candidate for them for the municipal council or parliament.

The data used by these VAAs has also been published as open data. As a result, many visualisations have been created which make it even easier than before for voters to reflect their own attitudes against those of different parties and candidates – or to analyse what kind of a person would be the perfect candidate for a Member of Parliament, according to the majority.

Online services are not merely restricted to voting. In the pilot version of the Kansanmuisti.fi online service, for example, you can follow the speeches and voting of MPs in parliament – to see whether they carry out their election promises in practice. According to the home page of Kansanmuisti, "in the future, you will also be able to cast your own 'vote' as if you were an MP and see how your opinions compare with those of the real MPs or civic organisations, in the manner of the VAAs. In future, you will also find election funding data compiled in one place."

The Datavaalit.fi community has been actively promoting the opening up of key data concerning elections and public decision-making. This community supported by the Finnish Innovation Fund SITRA built services for the 2012 municipal elections, which helped people to find not only basic information about the candidates, but also their updates in social media, and which enabled users to follow the accumulation of advance election funding notices.

It is interesting to see what is the future impact of being able to follow more easily the promises and actions of politicians. For example, will it have a decisive impact on people's voting behaviour or not? This would be worth researching.

It is clear that monitoring the actions of decision-makers will become easier and easier. But what else that is beneficial from the standpoint of citizens will open decision-making data be able to offer in future?

Co-operating with developers to build an open city

The Open Ahjo interface was only published in March this year and, as was learned from the council video interface project, it may take some time before developers really start making use of it. The city's Code4Europe partner coder, Juha Yrjölä, modified the Open Ahjo XML interface into the even more developer-friendly REST interface, which lowers the threshold of developers to grasp the subject. Yrjölä himself immediately took advantage of the new REST interface and programmed a prototype user interface with open source code onto the interface.

Open Ahjo brings decisions onto a map which can be searched by district and theme, and the cases and their history can be browsed in an illustrative way. With regard to council meetings, the application can also take advantage of the open. helsinkikanava.fi council video interface and, for each agenda item, it shows the speeches of the councillors as video clips. All the code produced by partner coder Yrjölä is available as open source code, so that anyone who wishes can use it and modify it.

To cite a real-life example, I have used the Open Ahjo application to find an explanation of why the city made a decision to increase the height of a block of flats in my neighbourhood from the planned eight storeys to 12 storeys (and, in the opinion of some of the residents, spoil the view). The application is in itself already an improvement on the present situation, but in the future it will become even better. A keyword search, for instance, will make it much easier for the users to find more information on cases that interest them.

This prototype application is opening people's eyes to all that can be done with open data. The intention, however, is not for the city to make all of its open-interface-based electronic services on its own – instead, the idea is that anyone would be able to use the interfaces to build the applications they desire. These can be used by citizens, district associations and the media – even companies that perhaps wish to analyse the city's decisions for commercial purposes.

One user of open decision-making data is the Openhelsinki.net community which is building a more advanced user interface for decision-related matters. The aim of this community is also to support dialogue between decision-makers and citizens by enabling the discussion of decision-related matters in social media channels, for example. In that way, it is easier to refer to the individual cases. Simply giving each matter a unique URL and offering 'Tweet this' and 'Share on Facebook' buttons would help their distribution through social media.

During the next few months, it will be interesting to see how many people find the open decision-making data and realise the possibilities that it offers. Helsinki is encouraging developers to use data to make useful applications and offering support and inspiration through, for example, the Helsinki Loves Developers (dev.hel.fi) developer portal, the Open Helsinki – Hack at Home support programme (openhelsinki.hackathome.com) and the open data application competition Apps4Finland (apps4finland.fi). The idea is for the developers to tackle the challenges faced by the city with the help of open data applications, and the best entries will be rewarded.

The themes of the competition challenges concern the monitoring of the city's decision-making and facilitating civic participation. In this respect, co-operation is also being carried out with the state administration, and one interesting perspective is how people can participate in discussion concerning municipal decision-making and influence it, for example through the Otakantaa.fi service provided by the Ministry of Justice.

EU supports the realisation of the vision

In summer 2013, the Helsinki Region Infoshare service was awarded €100,000 in the European Prize for Innovation in Public Administration contest. The intention is to use the prize money among other things to improve the compatibility of the decision-making data in Ahjo with the city's other data, such as financial and geographical information and statistics.

The prize money will also help to build our vision that – one day – the city's decision-related matters would be automatically linked to euros, plans and projects which, through different visualisations and applications, would be in a form that is easier for citizens to understand and to comment on.

We also want open data to inspire the development of new innovative services for citizens. We will use part of the EU prize money on finding ways to encourage the developer community to take part in producing applications that illustrate what can be achieved when data sets work together. In this, we are seeking co-operation with, for example, Open Knowledge Foundation Finland, the local developer community and other cities developing similar things.The EU has found our project so interesting that it has harnessed the expertise of Accenture together with a team of students from the College of Europe to carry out a case study on the project. The purpose of the study is to help us and others interested in the subject to understand how our work can be scaled and duplicated for other cities, and how co-operation with different actors in the open data ecosystem – such as developers – can be achieved in a fruitful way from a perspective of the different parties. The aim is also to benchmark projects around the world targeting administrative transparency from which we could learn and which could supplement the work we are doing.

Experimenting our way to the future

Open data is a reality, but it will take time before it is truly integrated as part of the activity and processes of the public sector. It is also a question of a digital revolution, which over time may change our culture and practices more comprehensively than we can now imagine.

There is, however, no benefit to be had from open data unless it meets demand and is used. It is to be hoped that in future different target groups will have at their disposal a wide range of electronic services and applications that enrich life and make it easier.

It would be great if, though the media, social media and other channels, even traditional e-mail, citizens could get more topical – and meaningful – information about the city's decision-making, and that this would encourage them to discuss and participate in public decision-making in many different ways. This would promote democracy.

Hopefully through this, decision-makers and officials, too, might get a better overall picture of the operations of the city, and support municipal decision-making through 'smart' recommendations based on different data. This would lead to better-informed decision-making.

Decision-making cuts through everything that a city does, and its analysis might also have interesting areas of application in urban research. Ahjo uses a classification of functions which is based on an information management plan drawn up by the City Archive at the City of Helsinki Urban Facts together with other city departments and public utilities. Open decision-making data could thus produce added value, for example in analysing the history and activity of the city's departments and utilities. An interesting additional source for such research would be the discussions on the council videos, provided that we find a way to publish their transcriptions as open data.

There are many hopes and wishes – and even more work to be done. Something that you can do is to promote the opening up of data in your field, encourage different actors to make use of data and to boldly experiment with how this can improve your own organisation. We do not always know where our experiments will lead, and the future rarely turns out exactly as we imagine it. But this makes the realisation of dreams all the more interesting!

— **VILLE MELONI** *is Project Manager in the Helsinki Region Infoshare project.*

PEKKA VUORI

Development of young population groups in Helsinki

SEPPO LAKSO

There are 150,000 young people aged 12 to 29 living in Helsinki, nearly 120,000 of whom are Finnish-speakers, 9,000 are Swedish-speakers and over 21,000 have another native language.

260,000 young people live in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area and a total of 323,000 in the 14 municipalities of the Helsinki Region, amounting to 27.5 per cent of all young people and young adults in Finland. A slightly higher proportion, 30 per cent, of the country's Swedish-speaking youth live in the Helsinki Region. The speakers of other native languages, in particular, are highly concentrated in the Helsinki Region; over half of Finland's foreign-language young people live in the region, and over a quarter live in the City of Helsinki.

In Helsinki, the number of young people aged 12 to 29 began to increase strongly during the recession of the 1990s, and today there are nearly a quarter, 30,000 people, more of them than in 1993. At first, the growth was influenced by the Act on the Municipality of Domicile of 1994, which enabled students temporarily residing in the area to register there. However, the growth has also continued in the 21st century, even though the younger age groups have temporarily decreased in size in that time.

The increase in the number of young people is a result of several factors. In recent years, Helsinki has not had a migration loss of families with children moving to neighbouring municipalities at the level of the early 2000s. People aged 25 to 29 are

Figure 1. The number of young people in Helsinki by age, 1 Jan 1990–2013 and the projection for 2014–2050



Figure 2. The number of Swedish-speaking young people in Helsinki by age, 1 Jan 2000–2013 and the forecast for 2014–2030



also more likely to stay in Helsinki than before. The city is experiencing a steady migration gain from the rest of the country with young adults coming here to study or work after the economic recession in the region in the early 2000s. Immigration is boosting the numbers of both school-age children and young adults significantly more than before.

Population projection

The number of lower comprehensive school aged children reached its peak in 2001. It then decreased by 5,000 pupils by 2010, but began to grow again after that. According to the projection, the previous peak level will be regained in 2017, and the age group will continue to grow strongly. By 2025, there should be 9,000 more lower comprehensive school-age children than today. The number of upper comprehensive school aged people took a downturn in 2006 and has since decreased by 2,100. However, that number will begin to increase again next year.

The age group of secondary school pupils aged 15 to 17 peaked in 2009, and has since decreased by 1,100. The bottom will be reached 2017, after which this age group will also start growing. After 2025, the growth will once again overtake the peak level of 2009. The total number of young people aged 12 to 17 is forecast to keep decreasing until 2016 and subsequently increase until the late 2030s. At that point, the number of young people in this age group will exceed 40,000, which is 11,000 more than the current figure.

The number of young adults aged 18 to 24 rapidly increased in Helsinki between 2005 and 2012. Their number is forecast to diminish as new, smaller age groups come of age. The population will decrease from the current 62,000 to 54,000 by the beginning of the 2020s. The number of people aged 25 to 29 is also projected to increase until the end of this decade, but then decrease quickly in a similar manner. However, these age groups are the largest groups moving to Helsinki. Over half the people moving into the city belong to these groups, and fluctuations in the number of in-migrants quickly affect the size of these age groups.

Figure 3. The number of young people with a native language other than Finnish, Swedish or Samí in Helsinki by age, 1 Jan 2000–2013 and the 2012 forecast for 2014–2030



The number of Swedish speakers aged 12 to 17 has now begun to decrease but will start to rise again in 2016. The number of those aged 18 to 24 is growing more quickly than forecast, but the growth is predicted to end in a few years' time. The increase in the number of Swedish-speakers aged 25 to 29 is accelerating. However, the proportion of Swedish-speaking youth of the entire demographic is expected to increase from the current 6 per cent.

The increase in the number of foreign-language youth aged 18–29 has accelerated significantly since 2005, due to an increase in foreign immigration. The growth has been especially fast in the 25 to 29 age group, since most of the people moving in are that age. However, in the future, the fastest growing group will be those aged 12 to 17, whose number will double by 2030.

The proportion of foreign-language residents aged 12 to 29 is currently almost 15 per cent of the age group, and is predicted to exceed 20 per cent in the early 2020s. In the Helsinki eastern major district, the proportion of foreign-language youth is nearly one quarter of all young people.

However, it must be noted that, in many bilingual families, children who are registered as foreign-language speakers also speak Finnish or Swedish in practice.

"Over half the people moving into the city belong to the age groups of 18- to 24-year-olds and 25- to 29-year-olds, and fluctuations in the number of in-migrants quickly affect the size of these age groups."



Figure 4. Young people aged 12 to 18 in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area in squares of 500 metres, 1 Jan 2012



Figure 5. Young people aged 19 to 24 in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area in squares of 500 metres, 1 Jan 2012

Young people in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area

The high concentrations of 12- to 18-year olds in Helsinki are located in the suburbs, especially those built in the 1990s and 2000s and in Eastern Helsinki in particular. On the other hand, there are many young people living in the densely built inner city, although families with children compose a smaller proportion of households there. Naturally, many young people living at home live in residential areas where most housing is family housing, separating the densely built areas from the more spacious areas in the city outskirts.

YOUNG PEOPLE AGED 19 TO 24, who are often moving to live on their own, primarily settle in the inner city, where there are many small flats available to rent or buy. People moving to Helsinki from other parts of the country usually find their first homes in the inner city and in student housing in the suburbs. Because of the nature of Helsinki's housing stock, with a large number of blocks of flats and small flats also in the suburbs, many housing options are available for young people.

Throughout the Helsinki Metropolitan Area, single-family neighbourhoods are typically areas which young people leave when they grow up, because the housing stock in these areas is usually not suitable for young people moving into their first own flat.

— **PEKKA VUORI** *is Project Manager at City of Helsinki Urban Facts.*

Sources:

Helsingin ja Helsingin seudun väestöennuste 2014–2050 (Population projection for Helsinki and the Helsinki region 2014–2050), City of Helsinki Urban Facts, Tilastoja 2013:29

Helsingin seudun vieraskielisen väestön ennuste 2013–2030 (Projection for the foreign-language population in the Helsinki region 2013–2030), City of Helsinki Urban Facts, Tilastoja 2013:5

PEKKA KAIKKONEN

TUULA JORONEN

Exclusion from work and studies – a problem for first generation immigrants

THE ARTICLE LOOKS at exclusion from work and studies among 15–29 year olds with a foreign background in Helsinki who had by the end of 2010 lived for at least a year in Finland. They are compared with young people overall in Helsinki. It appears that not having a job or a place to study is a problem among first generation rather than second generation immigrants. Indeed, immigrants are a mobile population group, and registers do not fully cover for this mobility.

Limiting the study to those only who had spent at least a year in Finland ensured that the analysis covers only immigrants residing relatively permanently in Finland. The definition of foreign origin is based on Statistics Finland's definition where a person has a foreign origin if both parents have been born abroad. First generation refers to people born abroad who have moved to Finland and second generation to those born in Finland and having a foreign background (Statistics Finland 2012, Martikainen and Haikkola 2010, 15).

This study draws on register data from Statistics Finland including data on main type of activity, education, income and housing among people of foreign origin in Finland at the end of 2010, classified according to the duration of their stay in the country (counting from the first year of arrival in Finland). The data on main activity type and employment were taken from Statistics Finland's employment statistics, which are based on around 40 administrative and statistical datasets. The demographic studied are those living permanently in Finland on the last day of the year. The time of reference for main activity is the last week of the year, but the statistics also include accumulated data from the statistical year, such as income and months of employment or unemployment (Statistics Finland 2013b). The analysis of main activity has mainly been carried out separately for men and women, since labour market behaviour usually varies according to gender and immigrant groups differ with regard to their proportions of men and women.

Differences between generations?

Earlier studies show that young people's risk of exclusion from work or studies is greater among those with a foreign background than youth with Finnish background (cf. Myrskylä 2011, 36–38; Teräs, Niemi et al. 2010). According to a study commissioned by the Finnish National Board of Education, for example, enrolment in general upper secondary education is slightly lower among first generation and slightly higher among second generation immigrants than among those with Finnish background (Kuusela et al. 2008). However, after completing their secondary studies, youth of foreign origin (both first and second generation) seem less likely to continue their studies than those with Finnish background. Statistics Finland reports that whereas (in the autumn semester of 2010) around 75 per cent of 16-24 year olds with Finnish background continued to pursue studies after having completed their upper secondary or lower education, 68 per cent of the second generation immigrants and only 50 per cent of the first generation immigrants of that age did. (Ruotsalainen and Nieminen 2012).

Access to further studies depends on school performance. According to Kilpi (2010), there is no essential difference in school performance in basic education between students with Finnish background and second generation immigrant students (measured in grade average and secondary education enrolment), when certain explanatory factors have been standardised, such as social deprivation of parents etc. Nor did Kilpi find an essential difference between first and second generation immigrants of the same immigrant group in their school performance. She did find differences in school performance between young immigrants coming from different countries, and in many immigrant groups, girls did not do quite as well in school as boys. Moreover, interest in vocational studies at secondary level was lower than average among second generation young immigrants (Kilpi 2010). At upper secondary level they have a stronger propensity than students with Finnish background to choose the general rather than vocational education, but since quite often they enter with lower marks than the majority, they run a higher risk of interrupting their studies.

Another important factor with regard to school performance and later entry into the labour market is the age at which young people have moved to Finland. According to Corak (2012, 109), in Canada for example, the critical age for school performance and continued studies is nine years. The age of the child at the time of immigration does not correlate with the likelihood to enter upper secondary education if immigration takes place before the age of nine. With those immigrating at a higher age, it does. A particularly risky age of immigration is 14–15 years, i.e. when young people are about to finish their compulsory education.

We can also assume that the length of stay in Finland has an effect on the risk of exclusion at least with those who have immigrated for reasons other than work or studies. For refugees and family-based immigrants it usually takes a while to find a job or place to study.

Main activity of young people of working age

In Helsinki in 2010, the number of 15- to 29-year-olds of foreign origin who had lived in Finland for at least a year was 15,196. Men were slightly more numerous than women. The majority had been born abroad, with only nine per cent (1,412 people) being second generation immigrants (born in Finland). Of those born abroad 51 per cent (N=13,784) had lived in Finland for five years or less, the rest for over five years.

Only one third of young people of foreign origin in Helsinki (33%, N=15,196) had a post-comprehensive qualification registered in Finland. Having a degree was noticeably more common among those born abroad (35%, N=13,784) than those born in Finland (14%, N=1,412). Women had completed this level of education more frequently (37%, N=7,512) than men (30%, N=7,684), and the gender-based differences were greater among those born abroad than those born in Finland.

Statistics on education were not comprehensive as regards immigrants' education, and lack data on education particularly for those first generation immigrants who have moved to Finland as adults and completed their education in the sending country. Nonetheless we may conclude from the data that the average education level is lower among youth of foreign origin than those with Finnish background. Of all young people of this age group in Helsinki, 65 per cent had completed some kind of post-comprehensive education (Statistics Finland 2013a).

Low level of education usually translates into a lower status on the labour market. Thus, young people of foreign origin were significantly more often unemployed than youth in Helsinki overall. Although it is clear that many 15–29-year-olds of foreign origin would benefit from broadening their education, they were less likely to pursue studies than their native peers. However, there was significant difference between first and second generation immigrants. While over half of the first generation immigrants were on the labour market as either employed or unemployed, only some second generation immigrants were, as the great majority of the latter (68%) were still at school or studying. Hardly anyone from the second generation was unemployed, and exclusion from work or studies was decidedly lower than among first generation immigrants (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Main type of activity of foreign-origin vs. all 15- to 29-year-old men and women in Helsinki 2010



Source: Statistics Finland 2012, pitkittäisaineisto (longitudinal data); City of Helsinki Urban Facts' Area Database

IT HAS BEEN MORE COMMON for women than men not to work or pursue studies. With young men of foreign origin it was roughly twice as common as among their native peers. With women, the difference is even clearer: young women of foreign origin were four times less likely to either work or study than their native peers. Thus women with a foreign origin seem to have stayed at home to take care of their households more frequently than both men of foreign origin and young women with Finnish background. For both men and women, first generation immigrants were more prone than second generation to stay outside work and studies.

Differences of main type of activity may at least partly relate to differences of age structure between demographic groups, because the age group of 15- to 29-year-olds covers young people in very different phases of life. The youngest have only just finished comprehensive school and are looking for a place in upper secondary education. Of those approaching the age of 29, many have already had time to acquire a profession or at least enter the labour market. Family situations also vary. Whereas the youngest probably live with their parents or are only about to move out, the oldest may well have a family of their own.

A closer look at the age structure reveals that youth with foreign and Finnish background differ somewhat in this respect. Figure 2 shows that of the 15- to 29-year-olds living in Helsinki in 2010, those with a foreign mother tongue were on average slightly older than those with Finnish or Swedish as their mother tongue. The proportion of under 20-year-olds was slightly smaller and that of over 25-year-olds somewhat greater among foreign than Finnish or Swedish native speakers.

An analysis based on mother tongue does not allow for first and second generation immigrants to be studied separately, and population statistics by country of origin were not yet available for Helsinki at the time of this article. But data on the Uusimaa province, in which Helsinki lies, can presumably reveal something about the distribution in Helsinki, since the foreign-background population of the region is heavily concentrated in Helsinki. According to these data, the age structures of first vs. second generation young immigrants are clearly different. In 2010, no less than 84 per cent of 15- to 29-year-old second generation immigrants in Uusimaa were under 20 years of age and the rest mainly under 25. Only four per cent were 25 to 29 years old. First generation young immigrants were clearly older: 51 per cent were 25 to 29 years old, 34 per cent 20 to 24 years old and only 15 per cent under 20 years old (Statistics Finland 2013a).

The large proportion of school children and students among second generation (Finland-born) immigrants thus seems to be related to their being much younger than first generation immigrants and young people with Finnish background. Similarly, the fact that exclusion from work or education was more common among first generation immigrants is presumably related to their not having found a job or a place to pursue secondary studies, or to their interrupting these studies for some reason or other more frequently than their native peers (Cf. Teräs, Niemi et al. 2010, 5; Kuusela, Etelälahti, Hagman et al. 2008, 186.)

Figure 2. Age structure of 15- to 29-year-old men and women in Helsinki by mother tongue (01.01.2011)



Source: Helsinki Region Area Database

THE MAIN TYPE OF ACTIVITY OF IMMIGRANTS also varies according to their length of stay in the new country, but as Figure 3 shows, a more decisive factor is whether a person has been born abroad or in Finland. We can also see that for young men born abroad, the length of stay has had very little impact on their entry into the labour market and gaining employment. With young women, presence on the labour market increases and employment rate rises clearly with the length of stay in Finland. With both men and women, the proportion of those pursuing studies initially grows with the length of stay, only to decrease when they subsequently enter into the labour market.

For those who have immigrated as minors, the decisive factor regarding school performance and entry into further studies and into working life is their age at the time of immigration. A vulnerable group in this respect are those who moved at the age where they were about to finish their compulsory education. The data did not include information about age at the time of migration, but on the basis of age and length of stay at the time of the cross-section, the age of migration could roughly be determined.

- **Those having stayed in Finland for 1-5 years had moved at the age of 10–28 years**
- **Those having stayed in Finland for 6-10 years had moved at the age of 5–23 years**
- **Those having stayed in Finland for 11-15 years had moved at the age of 0–18 years**
- **Those having stayed in Finland for over 15 years had moved at the age of 0–14 years**

Figure 3. Main type of activity in 2010 of 15- to 29-year-old men and women with foreign origin living in Helsinki, by length of stay in Finland



Source: Statistics Finland

ALTHOUGH THE DATA on age of migration are very rough, they can still be used to calibrate interpretations. The smaller-than-average proportion of students among those having stayed the shortest period of time in Finland may relate to the fact that they have all immigrated as teenagers or adults. The teenagers may have had difficulties getting a place to continue their studies, while the adults may already have acquired an education before they migrated. Those having stayed the longest in Finland have all moved here as minors. Since they have lived in Finland for a long time, a great many of them have already finished their studies, which has helped them to find a place on the labour market. This appears as a smaller-than-average proportion of students and greater-than-average proportion of employed.

How frequently the first generation immigrants fall outside work or studies also varies according to the country of birth (Figure 4). It appears to be most common with those coming from Western Europe, America and African countries. Among young men and women from Western Europe, the smaller proportion of students and greater proportion of



Figure 4. Main type of activity in 2010 of 15- to 29-year-old men and women with foreign origin in Helsinki, by continent of birth.

those excluded from the labour force for other reasons may partly relate to the fact that they were on average slightly older than those coming from other continents. Differences between African and non-EU European young immigrants do not, however, relate to age structure, because the age structures of the two groups were very similar. In both groups, the proportion of under 20-year-olds was larger than average and that of over 25-year-olds smaller than average (Statistics Finland 2013a).

Thus, a higher frequency of exclusion from studies or work among African than among non-EU European immigrants seems rather to relate to other factors than the age of immigration. Such factors would include abilities and qualifications provided by their country of origin with regard to entering the Finnish labour market. In these groups, differences between men and women are also the greatest. One explanation for higher-than-average exclusion from studies or work among women of Asian or African origin is probably that they have more frequently than others chosen to stay at home and take care of their households, as in these groups fertility has been higher than average (e.g. Joronen 2007, 303).

A higher frequency of exclusion from studies or work among African young immigrants presumably also relates to refugee background and a weak labour market status. For example, long-time reception of the income benefit has been found to be markedly more common than average among those having come to Finland as refugees or asylum seekers, and among them, especially those who are on parental leave or are otherwise occupied in the family circle (Tervola and Verho 2013).

We may conclude that remaining outside studies or work is a more common problem for the first generation than second generation immigrants. However, such exclusion may not be quite as common as it may look in the light of a register-based analysis like the present one. Immigrants are a dynamic population group, and registers do not necessarily cover all their movements. Since registers also include people of foreign origin who no longer live in Finland, the number of people who are outside the labour force for other reasons than studies is likely to be smaller than it may appear judging from the present data. These people have not been moved out from registers because they have not made an official notification of their moving away - something that quite a few fail to do. It is hard to estimate how large a share of those classified as being outside working life or studies have, in fact, left Finland. It is nevertheless possible to estimate which group has the highest number of these cases on the basis of what we know about those leaving Finland in general. The largest proportions of young people not having entered studies or working life in Finland were found among those coming from Western European countries or the Americas, and the smallest proportions among Eastern European immigrants (Figure 4). The first two were the groups with the greatest propensity to leave, while those belonging to the latter group were less likely than average to leave Finland. If the analysis had taken account of those moving away from Finland, the differences in exclusion from job or studies between immigrants from different parts of the world would presumably be smaller.

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

The economy of Helsinki: **Basic services consume city budgets**



Figure 1. Pennies/tax unit of net costs of Helsinki's basic services and tax unit 1950-1992

HEIKKI HELIN

Finland is a municipal state. Two thirds of the public service production is in the hands of municipal self-government. In this respect, Finland differs rather significantly from many European countries, as Finland has entrusted the municipalities with the provision of many such services that in other countries are the responsibility of larger administrative units or the state.

In spite of municipal self-government, however, municipalities are very dependent on the state. When the national economy grows, municipalities also receive their share of the growth as increasing tax revenues. When the economy contracts, the state cuts its subsidies to municipalities. These subsidies are the biggest single item in the state budget.

The state requires municipalities to provide services for their residents. It participates in the costs arising from their provision by paying state subsidies.

This article examines on a broad level the development of Helsinki's expenditure and income from 1950 to 2011. The increasing costs of the services required by the state have reduced the amount of leeway left for the city's economy.

Since the turn of the millennium, there have been years when tax revenues and state subsidies have been inadequate for the funding of basic services and investments. The deficit has been filled mainly with surplus income entries by the city-owned utility Helsingin Energia and by increasing the tax percentage. Investments have partly been financed by debt.

Expenditure increases – more functions decentralised to municipalities

In the post-war period, Finland built a welfare state. Citizens were offered new services and previous ones were expanded. The state encouraged municipalities to expand their services by participating in the costs arising from them by granting state subsidies.

Nevertheless, the state was short of funds. At the beginning of the 1950s, several committees worked to reduce state expenditure. These were popularly called 'slaughter committees' (teurastuskomiteat). Methods proposed included the reduction of state aid to many municipalities as well as stopping it completely for

Wrong kind of saving

▶ **THE GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSALS** aimed at reducing expenditure have assumed their strangest form in the report by the so-called 'slaughter committee', which was completed last spring... It must be said in short that the country's municipal sector has hardly ever seen a document which has been prepared by an eminent state committee but which is so one-sided and so blind to the situation of the municipalities as the report of the said committee. It is quite simple to save state expenditure by cancelling or fundamentally reducing state subsidies paid to municipalities for specific administrative branches. It is easy to see that this kind of saving is like weaving a cloth by unravelling it from the other end. The same citizens are part of both the state and the municipalities. No real saving will take place by reducing the state's expenditure and forcing the municipalities to correspondingly increase their expenditure. What will be achieved is that the tax burden will be increasingly transferred to the municipal taxation side and, owing to the nature of the apportionment tax of our present municipal taxation, will encumber those sections of the population not subject to state income taxation or only slightly subject to it. Significant economies will only be achieved by changing those regulations valid in different fields of administration, which set the level so high and, because of that, also make it as expensive as it is these days.

– Suomen Kunnallislehti, No. 7, 1951, Editorial

some municipalities, or granting it only on a discretionary basis. The central organisations of the municipalities were unanimous in criticising the proposals. The criticism was fierce, but the division of costs between local and central government has been a perennial source of conflict.

In the current debate as to how to close the 'sustainability gap' arising from ageing-related costs, the proposals to cut state subsidies to municipalities are again on the table. Because of this, it is worth revisiting an editorial in the local government journal Kuntalehti in 1951. It shows that the state policy and debate have not changed much in 60 years.

There appear to have been calls to rethink the norms already in the early 1950s, even though the municipal functions at the time were far fewer than they are now.

Public health, basic education, children's day care

In the 1970s in particular, services were expanded by virtue of the Primary Health Care Act, Children's Day Care Act and the Basic Education Act. In the municipalities, the state subsidies covered on average one-third of the net costs. In Helsinki their share was lower than the average.

Central and local government gradually grew together into an integrated public administration entity. This development took place at the cost of the municipalities' independence. The original wide-ranging autonomy of municipal self-government gradually gave way to the pressures of integration.

The municipal system was granted independence expressly to take care of local public services, in other words as a provider of public services based on the discretion and requirements of its own decision-making bodies.

According to Martikainen and Yrjönen (1977), the function for which the municipal system was given its independent position has, over time, also formed the justification for reducing its independence. More stringent demands to provide public services nationally in a uniform way have led to a requirement to standardise the activities of the municipal system providing public services, as well as the control and supervision of that activity.

Although the state took part in the costs arising from expanding obligations, an increasing share of the yield from Helsinki's tax percentage went to the so-called basic services, as shown in Figure 1. Basic services here include social and health services as well as education, culture and leisure services. Not all the specified basic services are compulsory to the extent that they are organised in the municipalities.



Figure 2. Helsinki tax funding and the net costs of basic services from 1993 to 2011 in euros per resident (based on the value of money in 2011)

Recession in the early 1990s cut more than one fifth of Helsinki's tax revenues. At the same time, the state reduced its subsidies to municipalities in order to balance its economy. As a result, tax funding was no longer sufficient to cover the costs of basic services.

Helsinki's expenditure has grown at a moderate pace. Services have been expanded when the income base has so allowed. People have taken a stoic attitude to the increase in tax percentage. The city's population growth and the new functions required of municipalities have necessitated an increase in the number of staff employed by the city (Helin 2002).

'Stabilising' municipal finances

Tax reform in 1993 severed the connection between taxes paid by corporations and the income tax percentage. Since 1993, the net costs of basic services have been proportioned to the city's tax revenues and state subsidies (Figure 2). The sum of tax revenues and state subsidies is called tax funding.

Figure 2 shows the net costs of basic services from 1993 to 2011 and tax funding in euros per resident based on the value of money in 2011[1]. The figure has some comparability issues on both the expenditure and income sides.

In the early 2000s, a change occurred in the economy of Helsinki: tax funding was insufficient to cover the net costs of basic services. Behind this was the 'municipal economy stabilisation solution' of the Lipponen Cabinet in 2002.

In a 2002 reform (Helin 2008), the state abandoned the recovery of value-added tax refunds, and in return decreased the municipal share of corporation tax yields by a corresponding amount. At the same time, the tax revenue equalisation of the state subsidy system was revised, which reduced the state subsidies of Helsinki and Espoo in particular. As a result of this reform, Helsinki lost about 1 billion Finnish marks (€170 million) in the year the system was introduced.

Thus began a review of the city's administration and a quest for savings. The figure also shows that expenditure was reduced and growth slowed down in the 2000s. Growth has been less than in many other cities. In spite of this, tax funding has not covered the costs of basic services.

In 2011, Helsinki increased its income tax percentage by one percentage point. That resulted in a situation where tax funding covered the costs of basic services for the first time. In 1993, the tax percentage was 16.00 and in 2011, 18.50.

1) Figure 2 shows the net costs of basic services from 1993 to 2011 and tax funding in euros per resident based on the value of money in 2011 .



Figure 3. Income entries for Helsingin Energia

Energy income entries and an increase in debt

Helsinki's financial leeway has narrowed as the costs of the so-called compulsory functions have increased. Room for manoeuvre has been provided for Helsinki by the city-owned public utility Helsingin Energia, from which the city entered as income a surplus €1.5 billion between 2003 and 2012 (Figure 3).

In the long term, however, the funding of basic services cannot be based on the profits of utilities. Achieving the emissions targets of the City of Helsinki will make a hole of tens of millions of euros in the city's revenues. Moreover, the state will take its share in taxes of any possible future incorporation of Helsingin Energia.

The city has had to fund part of investments through debt. In 2000, the city had loans amounting to €0.2 billion, and in 2012 €1.2 billion.

State to tighten the municipal economy in the coming years

In spite of Finland's municipal self-government, the municipal economy has been something of a left-over of the state economy. The underlying assumption has been that, whenever the benefit of the state so requires, the municipal economy can be flexible.

There are no great prospects of better times ahead for the municipal economy in the coming years, either. According to the Ministry of Finance, the Finnish economy has a 'sustainability gap' of 4.7% of gross domestic product, i.e. approximately 9.5 billion euro. The Government has said that half of this deficit must be covered by local government (Government's structural package 29 August 2013).

For the period 2014–2017, in addition to decisions already made, the Government also specifies that the municipal sector will be obliged to save 2 billion euro. The intention is to save one billion by eliminating municipal functions and obligations. The municipal functions survey[2] shows that Finnish municipalities have 535 statutory functions and almost 1,000 obligations, whose significance to the municipal economy varies.

At the turn of the 1990s, the Free Municipality Experiment introduced efforts to relax norms for municipal functions. In 2009 and 2010, the so-called 'norm bee' (normitalkoot) project[3], was implemented, with the purpose to study, reform and – if necessary – abolish norms that hindered the improvement of municipal productivity.

The Ministry of Finance has constantly criticised municipalities for lax financial management. This criticism has not stopped either the Government ministers nor Parliament from coming up with ideas for new functions for municipalities. Well-meaning political projects are constantly underway[4] but their final costs are often unknown or estimated too low. In the end, however, the municipality pays the bill. It is therefore no wonder that the municipal economy has tightened.

Structural reforms, the removal of norms and the pruning of municipal functions sound sensible, but for some reason the costs arising from new functions are not taken sufficiently seriously when decisions to adopt them are taken. As things are, one is easily mistaken into thinking that the municipalities are incapable of looking after their own finances, even though the tightening of the municipal economy largely stems from new functions imposed by the state and cuts to the state subsidies.

The Government, however, has failed to concretise where the discharging of functions should begin and which functions should possibly be discontinued. Major savings require, for example, an increase in group sizes in day care and schools, a lowering of the qualification requirements for municipal personnel and adjusting staff numbers.

The structural reform plans underway concerning municipalities and services will not save municipal expenditure, at least in the short term. On the contrary, they – and the state subsidy reform that is a standard part of every government programme – cause uncertainty in the municipalities, which doubtless has an effect on the operations and decision-making of the municipalities (Helin 2011).

The second billion will be raised through tax rises and, for example, by improving productivity. If that billion were to be raised completely through tax rises, that would mean an increase in the municipal tax percentage of more than one percentage point and a reduction in staff numbers. Municipalities have been forced into tax rises by record cuts to state subsidies; these cuts have already been agreed upon. Improving productivity is a staple concept of government bills, albeit one that is politically difficult to concretise. Government papers mention a reduction of 20,000 municipal employees.

2) Kuntien tehtäväkartoitus valmistui – kunnilla on 535 lakisääteistä tehtävää. ("Municipal functions survey: municipalities have 535 statutory functions"). 17 Jan 2013, Ministry of Finance bulletin 4/2013. http://www.vm.fi/vm/fi/03_tiedotteet_ja_puheet/01_tiedotteet/20130116Kuntie/name.jsp
3) Normitalkoot uudistamaan ja purkamaan kuntien tuottavuuden parantamista haittaavia normeja. ("Norms hindering municipal productivity growth to be revoked in 'norm bee') 18 Jun 2009 | Ministry of Finance bulletin 84/2009. http://www.vm.fi/vm/fi/03_tiedotteet_ja_puheet/01_tiedotteet/20090618Normit/name.jsp
4) Miljardi euroa kunnilla iskee palveluihin. ("€1bn savings means cuts to municipal services") Helsingin Sanomat 23 September 2013.


SAARA VUORJOKI

According to Minister of Finance, Jutta Urpilainen, "we are in the middle of a fog and are trying to navigate." All we know for sure is that the municipal economy will tighten even further.

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

Divergent regional economies in Europe

SEPPO LAAKSO & EEVA KOSTIAINEN

Helsinki and Baltic Sea metropolises in the network of European regions

POPULATION AND PRODUCTION have been concentrated in urban areas, which have a crucial role in the economy nationally and globally. Approximately half of the total output of the world is produced in regions covering only 1.5% of the land area of the globe (World Bank 2009). In Finland the Helsinki Metropolitan Area[1] – covering 0.25% of Finland's land area and 19% of the population – produces 30% of the GDP of the country. This article analyses the regional differentiation in Europe by using economic and social indicators and places the Helsinki region and other major cities of the Baltic Sea area in the framework of the regional network of urban Europe.

1) Cities of Espoo, Helsinki, Kauniainen ja Vantaa.

Introduction

Concentration and urbanisation are closely connected with economic developments. In general, the more advanced and productive the economy, the more urbanised the country. Europe is one of the most urbanised and economically advanced areas in the world. In spite of its modern economic structures Finland is still among the less urbanised countries in Europe because of geographical and historical reasons. However, since a late start in the mid-20th century, Finland's urbanisation has proceeded fast and this trend is expected to continue in the future. In Finland, like earlier in Western and Central Europe, the change from an agricultural to an industrialised and finally service oriented country has been connected with improved productivity, increased income level, concentration of production and rapid urbanisation.

Large urban regions – metropolises – are attractive locations for high productive industries and competitive enterprises. Urban concentrations provide enterprises with benefits of agglomeration: the clustering of firms and workers together increases productivity because density supports the efficiency of trade, communication and the distribution of knowledge and innovations. Consequently, GDP per capita in large urban regions is usually significantly higher than the national average. It is 40 % higher in the Helsinki Region than in Finland as a whole. Large urban regions are also attractive from the point of view of consumers: they provide superior diversification in terms of job opportunities, services and consumption but also good possibilities for social networks. Accessibility is an important factor connected with agglomeration: good transport connections for goods and personal transport are almost a necessary condition for a large, growing urban area. Improved accessibility has made it possible for many metropolises to expand and many of them have become large geographical networks with several sub-centres and many independent municipalities connected with a transport system.

Regions in Europe

The regional divisions used in this study are based mainly on the NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 divisions defined by the EU. From the point of view of large urban regions, the NUTS 3 division corresponds in most countries reasonably well with functional regions in terms of united regional labour and housing markets. In Finland the five NUTS 2 regions consist of large areas of the country while NUTS 3 regions are the same as the 20 regional council regions (maakunta). From the point of view of international comparisons, the Uusimaa region represents reasonably well the functional region of Helsinki[2]. In the case of the largest metropolises of Europe, NUTS 2 is usually the best division for representing functional urban regions (e.g. Paris, Rome and Warsaw) while London is divided to two NUTS 2 regions.

2) The specific definition of the Helsinki Region contains 14 municipalities around Helsinki while Uusimaa Region contains 26 municipalities by 2013 municipality division.

According to Table 1, there are 270 NUTS 2 regions and 1,294 NUTS 3 regions in EU. The average population is 1.9 million for NUTS 2 and 385,000 for NUTS 3. The Finnish NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 regions are smaller with respect to population but remarkably larger with respect to land area than the average in the EU. The Helsinki-Uusimaa Metropolitan Region[3] is close to the average of NUTS 2 regions in EU with respect to population (81 % of the EU average) while its land area is slightly over half of the EU's average and population density is 40 % higher than the average (table 1). When compared with the average of the NUTS 3 regions Helsinki-Uusimaa has 4-fold population and 3-fold land area.

Table 1. Statistics of NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 of EU and Finland in 2010

Division	Number of regions	Average population (1,000)	Minimum population (1,000)	Maximum population (1,000)	Average land area (km2)	Average population density (pop/km2)
EU NUTS 2	270	1,879	28	11,797	16,020	117
EU NUTS 3	1,294	385	10	6,336	3,340	117
Finland NUTS 2	5	1,070	28	2,672	60,780	18
Finland NUTS 3	20	268	28	1,421	15,196	18

– Data source: Eurostat and Statistics Finland



Figure 1. The population of metropolises (NUTS 2) in 2010, millions
–Source: Eurostat Regional Statistics Database & Uusimaa Regional Council Database

Regionally differentiated Europe

Strong concentration of population and production is a striking feature of the economic geography in Europe. A quarter of the population of the EU (and Norway and Switzerland) lives in the 23 most populous regions out of the 293 NUTS 2 regions. Helsinki-Uusimaa, with a population of 1.5 million, is 129th in the ranking and is situated among the medium sized European regions.

Production is even more concentrated: the top ten regions produce a quarter of the total output of the entire area. The largest concentrations are located in the economic core of Europe covering Western Central Europe, South-Eastern England, Northern Italy, and in the largest urbanised regions of France and Spain. The smallest regions in terms of population and output – many of them covering large areas – are located in the fringe of Eastern and Northern Europe, in islands, and in the mountainous areas of Central and Southern Europe. The differences are even more striking when we consider the variation of population density between NUTS 2 regions. The density in the top regions is tens of times higher than in the median region. However, it must be noted that the way the borders of the NUTS 2 regions are defined affects the results but still, it does not influence the big picture.

3) NUTS 3 until 2012; NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 from 2013 on.



Figure 2. GDP in European regions (NUTS 2) in 2009, millions of Euro
–Source: Eurostat, Regional Statistics Database & Statistics Finland, Regional Account

Another prominent observation is the vast income difference between regions measured by GDP per capita (adapted to purchasing power standard). In the top regions GDP per capita is more than ten times higher than in the poorest regions. The richest regions are the leading metropolises in the Western Central Europe (plus London and Paris) and Nordic countries. The poorest regions are rural and ex-industrial regions in the fringes of Eastern Europe. Consequently, the East-West division is still strong in Europe. The top regions in terms of GDP per capita are major concentrations of high productivity industries and specialised services, locations of top universities and R&D activities, as well as sites of global corporations, and they function as international transport hubs. They have well-educated labour force and high employment rates. The rich regions are also target areas for national and international migration. Most of the richest regions are ranked high in the international comparisons of quality of life and attractiveness.

The poorest regions are dominated by the opposite factors: traditional agriculture and other low productivity production, low educational level of the population and poor accessibility. Their age structures are skewed towards the elderly and they suffer from out-migration and high mortality rates.

Figure 3. GDP Purchasing Power Standard per inhabitant in European regions (NUTS 2) in 2009, % of the EU average
–Source: Eurostat, Regional Statistics Database & Metropolitan Regions Database

Nordic capitals and other Baltic Sea metropolises

Among the European regions Nordic capital regions – Copenhagen, Helsinki, Oslo and Stockholm – form a group which has a lot in common. They are all middle-sized regions with respect to population. However, they are significantly larger in terms of the volume of production output: all are located in the first quartile in the size ranking of NUTS 2 regions: Stockholm highest as 32nd and Helsinki 58th. Nordic capitals are also rich and productive metropolises: all belong to the top twenty in the ranking of GPD per capita of NUTS 2 regions. They score high in rankings of innovativeness, for example in terms of R&D inputs relative to GDP. Employment rates are also high; Stockholm and Oslo are near the top but Helsinki and Copenhagen are also located in the first quartile. High housing prices are also a common feature of the Nordic capitals while there is a difference with respect to density (population relative to land area): land use in Copenhagen and Stockholm is much denser than in Helsinki. Finally, all Nordic capitals are ranked high





Figure 4. R&D expenditure in European regions (NUTS 2) in 2009, % of GDP –Source: Eurostat, Regional Statistics Database & Statistics Finland

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in international comparisons of living conditions and liveability. For example, all of them were among the top twelve in the Economist Intelligence Unit's Liveability Ranking 2012 among the European cities.

When we look at the wider group of the Baltic Sea metropolises the picture becomes much more heterogeneous. Hamburg is one of the richest regions in Europe and is close to the Nordic capitals on most of the criteria of this study. Berlin belongs to the large metropolises in Europe but in terms of GDP per capita it is close to the mean of the NUTS 2 regions. It differs from Nordic and other leading large metropolises with respect to housing prises which are exceptionally low in Berlin. Warsaw is also one of the largest metropolises and, like Berlin, its GDP per capita does not differ much from the mean of the Europe. Warsaw has grown in a stable manner even during the years of the financial crisis and approached gradually the GDP per capita level of the leading metropolises of Northern Europe. In Warsaw housing prises are higher than in Berlin but lower than in Nordic capitals. Of the capital cities of the Baltic countries Riga and Vilnius are mid-sized regions in terms of population while Tallinn is smaller than the others. In terms of GDP per capita the Baltic capitals are located quite low in the ranking of the regions of Europe. Their economies suffered much in the financial crisis of 2008–2009 causing a collapse in GDP and employment followed by out-migration and population decline. However, the Baltic capitals, especially Tallinn, have revived relatively well after the depression and are catching up with the other regions of the Baltic Sea Area.

THE FINANCIAL AND DEBT CRISIS IN EUROPE since 2011 has affected European countries and cities differently. The acute debt crisis and the most serious effects have concentrated in Mediterranean countries and Ireland while Northern Europe – including Germany, Poland, Baltic countries and Nordic countries – has mainly been affected indirectly, especially via declining export demand and pressure for public-sector budget cuts. In this framework the Baltic Sea metropolises have coped relatively well compared with the metropolises in Southern Europe, even as the production growth has halted and unemployment started to increase also in the Baltic Sea area. Taking into account the strong position of the leading city regions in their national economies, one can say that the Baltic Sea metropolises have represented a stabilising force in the economy of Europe.

A striking feature in the development is the accelerating population growth in all Baltic Sea metropolises. In all capital regions of the Nordic countries, as well as in Berlin and Hamburg, immigration has increased, speeding up the population growth during the last few years. This is at least partly a consequence of the European economic crisis which has redirected migration flows both within Europe and from other continents towards the north. Warsaw and the Baltic capitals have seen a lively migration back to the home country from Great Britain and Ireland since the start of the economic depression in those countries. At the same time there have been an increasing number of migrants from Estonia – mainly from outside Tallinn – to the Helsinki region. While there may be frictions connected with immigration the population growth caused by migration has had positive effects on regional economies via increasing demand for trade, local services and housing, and for the supply of labour (Laakso & al 2013).

Figure 5. The liveability ranking of European cities in 2012. –Source: EIU Liveability Ranking 2012



Figure 6. The average price for an apartment in selected metropolises in 2007–2009, €/m² (Helsinki=Helsinki Metropolitan Region 2009) –Source: Eurostat, Urban Audit Database & Uusimaa Regional Council Database



Concluding remarks

The pull of the most successful metropolises is maintained by their ability to create and accumulate human capital based on knowledge, expertise and social skills. This cannot be created simply by investing in physical capital while it is also necessary. However, diversified communication possibilities have become a key factor of accessibility, together with transport systems. An important feature of the urbanisation of the last few years is growing international interaction in terms of travelling, immigration and trade. These international flows have grown fast due to integration, the lowering of borders and improved transport and communication, and are also strongly concentrated in metropolises.

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MARTTI TUOMINEN | HENRIK LÖNNQVIST | TEEMU KEMPPAINEN

PERCEIVED INSECURITY in Helsinki is spatially concentrated – explaining the area differences

SINCE 2003, HELSINKI HAS REGULARLY SURVEYED residents' perceptions of security. Perceived insecurity is more of a problem for women than for men, and exposure to violence or threats quite understandably increase people's sense of insecurity. Similar findings have been obtained in numerous studies internationally. In addition, there are large differences in perceived insecurity between districts in Helsinki. In this article, we try to find background factors for these differences.

JOUKO VATANEN

Safety in the urban public space can be studied in many ways. Polling people's sense of security is one way – a justifiable way because perceptions do not always correlate directly with crime statistics. According to the so-called fear paradox, the population groups with the most frequent experiences of violent crime, such as young men, are also the least afraid (Stanko 2000).

THE FEAR PARADOX DOES NOT, however, allow the conclusion that perceived insecurity would be an unjustified or less important approach than crime statistics. Insecurity is in itself a strong experience that reduces the quality of life of the perceiver, and safety and security are seen as key factors for wellbeing (Johansson 1979). Subjective experiences may also have rather concrete consequences. Perceived insecurity makes people avoid places and situations that make them feel unsafe, thus limiting their usual environment but also changing the user profile of the places in question (cf. Koskela 2009). Perceived insecurity influences urban space also in the sense that it reduces residents' satisfaction with their neighbourhood (Basolo & Strong 2002) and increases their propensity to move away (Kortteinen et al. 2005).

THE ISSUE OF PERCEIVED INSECURITY can be approached from the angle of individual factors. Survey after survey indicates that perceiced insecurity is particularly a problem for women (Pain 2001; Ceccato 2012). Research evidence is less conclusive for other individual-level factors such as age, socio-economic status and personal experience of violence (cf. Pain 2001; May 2010). Since there are great differences in perceived insecurity between neighbourhoods (i.e. districts in this study), we should also look at the characteristics of neighbourhoods to gain an understanding of perceived insecurity.

Figure 1. **Perceptions of insecurity by district in Helsinki, 2009**



Dependent variable:

- Perceived insecurity. The question asked in the survey was how secure the respondents felt when they walked alone in the neighbourhood late on a Friday or Saturday night. The replies classified as expressing insecurity were 'rather insecure', 'insecure' and 'I dare not go outside'.

Explanatory variables at individual level

- Gender, age group and education

Experience variables at individual level:

- Experiences of violence or threats over the past year, as reported by respondents
- Violence observed or seen in the neighbourhood (assault and battery, fights)

Neighbourhood-level variables

- Housing tenure and type of building
- Police intervention by district (February 2010 – December 2011) with the following titles:
- intoxicated persons, disturbing behaviour, vandalism
- Male unemployment rate in the district in 2009
- Proximity to a rail station: the respondents who live in a sub-district surrounding a station

It seems unlikely that selection is at play here, in other words a situation where those people who feel more insecure than average would be concentrated in the same neighbourhoods. Our focus must cover not only personal characteristics but also the characteristics of neighbourhoods, and we must examine what features in neighbourhoods may feed differences in perceived insecurity. In this article, we analyse experienced insecurity using a number of individual-related variables from the research data of the 2009 Security Survey in Helsinki, as well as three neighbourhood-related variables.

The Security Survey has been conducted in 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2012 (the data for 2012 were being collected at the time this article was written). One of the key findings is that people's perception of security in their own neighbourhood has remained approximately at the same level in all surveys – with a slightly positive trend. Men and women differ markedly in terms of perceived security: 24 per cent of women and 11 per cent of men had felt unsafe in their own neighbourhood in 2009. The most relevant finding for the present question is that the levels of perceived insecurity in some districts may be many times higher compared to other districts, and that these differences have become structurally rather permanent.

Research design

Our dependent variable was insecurity perceived by respondents in their own neighbourhoods. The explanatory variables were of two kinds: individual-level and neighbourhood-level variables. The explanatory variables at individual level were also of two kinds – concerning respondents' background or their experiences. The background variables were gender, age and education. Experience-based variables were experiences of violence by respondents and witnessed violence in the neighbourhood (so-called indirect exposure to violence). The data on respondents' housing and tenure status is technically (as obtained from the survey) a personal-level variable, but it also describes the nature of the neighbourhood.

Variables at district level are data on police intervention, male unemployment rates and whether or not respondents lived near a metro or railway station. These data describe the properties of districts.

Our assumption was that police interventions would be an objective indicator of unrest in a neighbourhood, and we surmised it would also show in perceived insecurity. Male unemployment (or low employment) rates have in earlier studies been found to correlate with the occurrence of perceived insecurity. Railway or metro stations are, by our assumption, hotspots of anti-social behaviour.

Gender and experiences of violence were decisive

The most crucial finding of the Security Surveys, namely that perceived insecurity is primarily a problem for women, has been corroborated by many studies. This also applies for Helsinki, and therefore when we look at the effects of other perceived insecurity factors, men and women are analysed separately, and comparisons are always made to the average of male and female perception of insecurity.

Thus, the differences between the perceptions of insecurity of men and women (women 24%, men 11%) do not appear as such in Figure 2. Only the difference with regard to the average of male and female perception does. To give an example, 15- to 24 year-old-men experience slightly over two percentage points less insecurity than the average of male respondents. The level of perceived insecurity in the youngest women, on the other hand, is six points higher than that of the female respondents overall.

Over 65-year-old women feel noticeably less insecure than younger women. As Heiskanen points out (2002, 184), research findings on the effect of age on experiences of insecurity have been varied. Those of the Helsinki Security Survey are probably influenced by the fact that one of the reply alternatives was 'I don't go out at night', which was ticked by over 30 per cent of 65-year-old or older female respondents. We may assume that without this alternative, the proportion of elderly women feeling unsafe would have been larger.

Figure 2. **Relationship between individual-level variables and perceived insecurity**



THE IMPACT OF EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND on perceived insecurity is not strong, but we may generalize that those with a low education level more often feel insecure than the higher educated. Men and women with only a basic education experience more insecurity than average, whilst those with a tertiary education have fewer such experiences.

THE VARIABLES EXPRESSING individual experiences strongly influence perceived insecurity. In both men and women, personal experience of violence or threats, or witnessed violence in the neighbourhood, significantly increase perceived insecurity. In fact, witnessing violence has an even stronger impact than personal experiences of violence.

THIS FINDING IS PUZZLING, because we might assume that personally experienced violence or threats are stronger experiences that make people feel more insecure than does the witnessing of violence. There are, however, two plausible explanations. Firstly, experiences of violence are most common with young men, who may be more used to violence in their daily life (also as perpetrators of violence), and therefore less prone to get worried about it. Another reason may be that the survey question concerning violence and threats also concerned respondents' workplaces and homes. These experiences did not necessarily relate to their own neighbourhood.

A CONCLUSION CLOSE AT HAND for those who have witnessed violence in their own neighbourhood is that violence can happen to anyone, even in the proximity of one's home. Moreover, the question seems a very reliable gauge that is not, for example, tinged by perceived insecurity. Men more often than women reported having witnessed violence, which seems a very plausible reflection of everyday reality.

Neighbourhood matters

Scarce economic resources are a background factor often related to perceived insecurity (cf. Hale 1996, 103). The security surveys in Helsinki have not contained questions on income and assets, but questions on housing may partly be used as a compensating variable. Those with high incomes and wealth more generally live in owner-occupied homes, and in fact, tenure status does correlate clearly with the occurrence of perceived insecurity, in an expected way. Both men and women living in single-family houses felt less insecure, and those living in subsidized housing felt more insecure than average. The question remains what this difference tells us about. Do financial resources generally protect people against insecurity in life, or does the difference stem from differences in everyday life between single-family neighbourhoods and areas dominated by subsidized housing.

THE OCCURRENCE OF PUBLIC DISORDER in a neighbourhood – as measured through police intervention – is an easily interpreted district-level variable. In a way, it is an indicator parallel to violence witnessed by respondents. The impact is consistent and it concerns both men and women. Without such correlation between the number of police interventions and perceived insecurity in a neighbourhood, the whole concept of insecurity would have to be reconsidered.

VAATTOVAARA AND KORTTEINEN (2012, 64) find that low employment rates and perceived insecurity among men are found in the same areas in the Helsinki Region. They point out that experiences of insecurity are an incentive for selective migration from an area. In the present study, concerning Helsinki, we found an expected correlation between male unemployment rates and perceived insecurity. Juha Kääriäinen has noted that it is possible that in neighbourhoods troubled by unemployment, where other social problems are often also present, people have to encounter situations that arouse fear. Public disturbances caused by drunks, or fights in neighbouring families may be examples of such situations (Kääriäinen 2002, 19). We shall return to these questions in our conclusions below.



Figure 3. Relationship between district-level variables and perceived insecurity.

WE INCLUDED IN THE EXPLANATORY variables the question whether respondents lived near a railway or metro station for the reason that Helsinki's Central Railway Station is the most prominent concentration of uncivil behaviour and violence in Finland. Therefore we ask whether smaller rail stations also constitute concentrations of perceived insecurity in a city. According to our findings, living near a railway or metro station increases experienced insecurity in both men and women – slightly more so with men.

SUCH A STATION IN A RESIDENTIAL NEIGHBOURHOOD is a strong physical-functional element channelling pedestrian traffic to and from public transport. The spatial structure of the stations takes pedestrians over bridges and through tunnels or fenced-in platforms, which causes crowds. Stations tend to attract groups of troublemakers – as mentioned by Kääriäinen – and the crowds encounter them or rather try to walk by. Stations are special environments because traffic safety aspects limit people's movement in many ways and they stand still for long times waiting for trains.

A complex whole

The first answer to the question of who has the most experiences of insecurity is women and young women especially. Men are essentially less concerned, at least when the question is put directly. This is also easy to understand intuitively. Furthermore, education – and above all the highest education – appears to reduce insecurity. However, this correlation may stem from differences between districts: those with a higher education rarely live in subsidized housing. Being exposed to violence will increase people's sense of insecurity, which is also easy to understand.

INDIRECT EXPOSURE TO VIOLENCE, that is, witnessing violence in one's own neighbourhood is, however, the strongest factor triggering perceived insecurity. To see real violence happen is a shocking experience to most people. The present findings endorse this. Although witnessing violence is an individual-level variable in our analysis, it also has a strong district-related dimension. In areas where violence is most frequently witnessed, perceived insecurity is also more frequent. There is a strong local correlation (0.86) between perceived insecurity and the witnessing of violence. It is also easy to understand that in neighbourhoods with a high frequency of police interventions people feel more insecure.

> **"Women are afraid** in places where there is no help at hand when needed. Men typically experience insecurity in crowded places late at night. In a way, rail station areas provide the environment for both situations."

OUR INTERPRETATION of the impact of rail stations is that it is a matter of their physical-functional structure, on the one hand, and their social dimension on the other. In other words, stations (for instance, the heated facilities in metro stations) attract groups of troublemakers. If something happens, violence will be remembered by many people instead of just a few, multiplying the impact.

IN HER WORK PELKOKIERRE ("The Fear Spiral") (2009, 79–80), Hille Koskela suggests that men and women feel insecure in different kinds of places. Women are afraid in places that are hard to escape and where no help is at hand when needed. Men, on the other hand, typically experience insecurity in crowded places late at night: in front of bars and in different kinds of queuing situations. At a certain stage of drunkenness men easily start to squabble. In a way, rail station areas provide the environment for both situations. They may be at least momentarily – late on Friday nights, for example – crowded enough with drunken revellers to provide opportunities for social conflict. Also, smaller stations in particular may also be deserted and thus provide no social support. In a situation of distress, a surveillance camera cannot compensate for real social control.

BUT IT IS LESS OBVIOUS how we should interpret the significance of certain district-level variables of perceived insecurity. With men, higher rates of unemployment and living in subsidized housing increase insecurity. But exactly how this correlation works is partly unclear. In the geographic socioeconomic pattern of Helsinki, many dimensions of deprivation are concentrated in the same neighbourhoods. In other words, deprivation accumulates locally.

THE CORRELATION BETWEEN DEPRIVATION and higher perceived insecurity does not, in itself, tell us anything about the causality of the relationship. We might, for example, draw the conclusion that immigrants cause insecurity, because they predominantly live in areas marked by deprivation. However, this could be an erroneous conclusion, since we know from the open answers in the questionnaires that immigrants are relatively seldom mentioned as a cause of insecurity.

AT THIS STAGE, we may at least state that perceived insecurity seems to provide an additional dimension to traditional indicators of deprivation in the geographic socioeconomic structure in Helsinki. Also, a neighbourhood-level analysis of perceived insecurity has a natural link to the debate on differentiation between neighbourhoods. Considering the importance of security and safety to everyday wellbeing and to modern society at large (cf. Koskela 2009), there is reason to study to what extent perceived insecurity influences households in their choice of neighbourhood. One of the qualities most frequently mentioned in polls on housing preferences is peace and quiet (Asukasbarometri 2010). Since the well-to-do have better opportunities to choose their neighbourhood, insecurity may play a part in the process of spatial segregation.

> **"Perceived insecurity** provides an additional dimension to traditional indicators of deprivation in the geographic socioeconomic structure in Helsinki. A neighbourhood-level analysis of perceived insecurity has a natural link to the debate on neighbourhood differentiation."

— **MARTTI TUOMINEN** *and* **HENRIK LÖNNQVIST** *are researchers at City of Helsinki Urban Facts.* **TEEMU KEMPPAINEN** *is doctoral candidate at the Department of Social Research, University of Helsinki.*

Sources

> see page 88.

TIA MELLBERG

▶ Helsinki Winter Graffiti 2013 competition at Kalasatama.

LEGAL GRAFFITI in Helsinki

MIKA HELIN

IN MAY 2009, HELSINKI OPENED its first authorised graffiti wall at Suvilahti. The opportunity to use graffiti walls was extended to Kalasatama in summer 2010 and 2011. This article presents the results of an ethnographic survey on the users and usage of the graffiti walls at Suvilahti and Kalasatama. The subject has never been previously researched. The results open up new perspectives on both the present state of the Helsinki graffiti phenomenon and on the opportunity to create an urban space by means of legal graffiti.

From the margins to producers of urban space

In Finland, illegal graffiti painting is considered malicious damage under criminal law, if the person destroys or damages the property of another. Legal graffiti means producing graffiti in a public space open to all and in constant use without risk of legal consequences. Typically legal graffiti sites are built and authorised by a department of the city administration or a private owner. Legal graffiti aims not only at enabling graffiti as a hobby and making public spaces more pleasant, but also at reducing the creation of illegal graffiti. Legal graffiti is done on fences, walls, transport containers, cellophane or other wall-like surfaces, whose purpose has been agreed in advance.

In the cases of Suvilahti and Kalasatama, the use of the word 'graffiti' instead of the term 'street art' to describe the painting is justified, because almost all the painted works are methodologically and stylistically based on New York graffiti.[1] A graffitist (graffiti enthusiast or artist) is someone who, in his/her legal painting activity from a local graffiti tradition, relies on the graffiti culture phenomenon created in New York in the late 1960s, which spread worldwide in the early 1980s. (Fleisher & Lovino 2012, Gastman & Neelon 2011, Felisbret 2009, Stewart 2009; Cooper & Chalfant 1984.)

PRACTISING LEGAL GRAFFITI in a public space has been only scarcely researched in Finland (Malinen 2011) and globally (McAuliffe 2012 & 2013, Kramer 2010, Snyder 2009, 97–103, D'Amico & Block 2007, ECPN 2001, Cooper & Sciorra 1996). There has been a need to study local authorised graffiti painting because, as a result of establishing the Suvilahti graffiti wall, an example of new graffiti policy and it possibilities has been created. The establishment of Helsinki's first graffiti walls has been an event of national importance: other places in Finland have been following the policy of the capital and many cities have recently begun discussions on setting up sites for graffiti. (Vantola 16 Jun. 2013, 10.)

THE INTRODUCTION OF THE SUVILAHTI GRAFFITI wall was based on a change of graffiti-related policy that took place in the Helsinki City Council on 26 November 2008. At the same time, the 'Stop töhryille' (Stop the Scrawls) project of the City of Helsinki that ran from 1 January 1998 – 31 December 2008 was coming to an end, and this project did not permit the city to establish legal sites for graffiti.[2] In Helsinki, the first

1) New York-style graffiti (masterpiece) differs from many other kinds of graffiti or street art (Lewisohn 2008, 23, 90; Kimvall 28.9.2007, 1–9; Lunn 2006, 5). New York graffiti is characterised by sticking to tight aesthetic shape requirements. Painted graffiti consists of stylised text, which represents the signature of its creator, an abbreviation of the name of the crew specialised in graffiti painting or sometimes a word that makes a statement. In addition to the text, there may also be supplementary images and detailed backgrounds. Graffiti is painted using a can of spray paint manually controlled. New York graffiti arrived in Helsinki with the premiere of the Beat Street film on 10 August 1984.

2) The 'Stop töhryille' project began in 1997 by a decision of the Helsinki City Council (28.5.1997: 24, 46–48; see also City of Helsinki 7.12.1998, 12–13 & 17.4.2000, 1–3). The aim of the project was to eliminate all graffiti, stickers and posters from the streets of Helsinki through a policy of zero tolerance as soon as it was announced. During the project, the City of Helsinki did not allow legal graffiti sites to be set up, as the prevailing view was that legal and illegal graffiti were inextricably linked and, as phenomena, fed off each other. According to Wilson & Kelling's (1982) thesis about broken windows, it was considered that legal graffiti, too, causes crime and decay. According to the thesis, there is a direct connection between observed disorder and crime.



Authorised graffiti fences and walls have been located at the Suvilahti Cultural Centre and Kalasatama building site since May 2009.

authorised place for graffiti was Lepakko in Ruoholahti from 1986 to 1999. Lepakko was a former warehouse building, which had already become notorious in the 1970s as a venue for subcultures.

Between 2009 and 2013, the graffiti walls available in Suvilahti and Kalasatama have concentrated the painting activity of graffitists in one place. The architect who participated in planning the temporary functions of the Kalasatama building site reckoned that *the need for a place to paint was great and that repressed subcultures such as graffiti would be channelled to the area* (Siitonen 18 Sep 2013). Because of the unrestricted use of the public space, the exact number of users of the area's graffiti walls is not known, but the total number of graffitists there is estimated to be about 400–500. All in all, it is thought that 800–1,000 people go to the graffiti walls to paint every year. At its greatest, the total length of graffiti walls has been almost one kilometre.

In summer 2013, a change to the operating model of temporarily concentrating graffiti in Kalasatama was initiated, looking towards a more decentralised model. This change has meant a decrease in the painting surface area in Kalasatama and the opening of new graffiti sites in different districts of the city. By autumn 2013, four new graffiti sites open to all and in constant use had been opened, as well as two temporary projects. (See City of Helsinki 9 May 2012 and 16 May 2013).

Field work and tortuous negotiations

In Suvilahti and Kalasatama, summer 2012 was the right moment to focus on graffitists in many different ways. An ethnographic survey based on field work suits the research task, the purpose of which is to find targeted quantitative information about a certain place or situation and about the community that uses it (Schensul et al. 1999, xxii). The research method is unusual as, typically with graffitists, either a small group study is done by interviewing or visual mappings of the graffiti paintings are made (Isomursu & Jääskeläinen 1998, Komonen 2012, Moisio 2013).



Figure 1. Number of years since the respondent started doing graffiti (N=166)

The study of the users and use of graffiti walls required field work, as information was not otherwise available. Field work has meant meetings with the graffitists at the graffiti walls, filling in questionnaires and collecting conversational and photographic material. In addition to filling in the questionnaires, notes were made of discussions and six semi-structured interviews were recorded. Often, the target group of an ethnographic survey may be difficult to reach in terms of physical or social location. In that case, producing information together requires throwing oneself into tortuous negotiations about filling in the questionnaire. The ethnographic survey was based on a sample.

The field work with the graffitists produced a total of 186 filled-in questionnaires. Of the persons approached, only seven refused to take part. The ethnographic questionnaire contained 21 questions about the users of the graffiti walls and their use. The main questions were outlined as follows: Who are the users of authorised graffiti walls? How are authorised graffiti walls used? What kind of sociality manifests itself in the practice of authorised graffiti art? What sort of opinions do graffitists have about the effects of authorised graffiti walls? The main results will be presented in the next sections.

'Middle ageing' is a fact

Place of residence

The use of graffiti walls at Suvilahti and Kalasatama can be considered as a phenomenon of Helsinki, as 74% of the respondents to the questionnaire said that they live in Helsinki. Almost 10% of the respondents were from Espoo and slightly fewer (7%) from Vantaa. The proportion of graffitists who had come from other cities was about 10%. At the walls, there was also a certain amount of 'graffiti tourism' from abroad.

Age and gender

The age range of the graffitists was wide, all the way from minors to middle-aged people. The average age of respondents was a little under 30. The proportion of under-30 year-olds was 65% and almost 60% of the respondents were over 26. Of all respondents, the share of 18-35 year-olds was 80%. At the extremes of the age range were the age groups under 18 and over 36, each of which had a share of about 10%. The lion's share of the respondents using the graffiti walls were men (95%). An artist who had held graffiti training workshops said:

'Middle ageing' is a fact. It is now the largest actively operating group, but new eager talents are emerging. Of the young people who try it out, about ten percent may like it and so carry on. (—Graffitist A)

'Getting up' time

As regards the length of time grafftists have been creating graffiti (the 'getting up', to use the term favoured by graffiti writers), respondents can be divided into groups that represent a cross-section of the history of Helsinki graffiti. This also indicates the effect of the authorised graffiti walls in concentrating the activity spatially. Firstly, the respondents who have been practising the art for 21–30 years are the 1980s graffiti pioneers who represent about 15% of the respondents. These pioneers started painting graffiti between 1984 and 1991. Secondly comes the generation that sprouted at the beginning of the 1990s when graffiti became a mass craze. This generation started painting graffiti between 1992 and 1996, and represents a little over 20% of respondents. The third group took up the pastime during the 'Stop töhryille' project in 1997–2006. This group's share of all respondents was over 30%.

The fourth group of respondents can be seen as representing the advent of legal graffiti. The group that started between 2007 and 2012 is the largest single group using the graffiti walls. Of all respondents, their share was more than 30%. Typically, respondents started to paint graffiti between the ages of 10 and 20. An exception to this was the group of people in the 36–40 age group, 12% of the respondents, who started their activity during the time of the authorised graffiti walls at more than 30 years of age.

It is essential to notice that the users of authorised graffiti walls have started their painting activity in a different time and societal conditions, and thus the idea of what graffiti stands for might also differ among graffitists.

For me, the graffiti walls have meant that zero tolerance has ended, that we have been given the chance to create graffiti. This is the most important thing for me. In some way, graffiti has deservedly become more acceptable. I think it's great that people have been able to see how wonderful it can be in a public space. (—Graffitist B)

Main occupation

A little over 50% of respondents were in paid employment. A few percent were entrepreneurs. The second largest user group was students, who constituted 25% of respondents. About 3% said that they were studying while working. The unemployed and pensioners formed about 18% of respondents. In the view of one graffitist:

In my opinion, for years the media and others have smeared the graffiti culture, saying they're just junkies down by the railway doing criminal stuff although it's not like that. We're ordinary people who go to work. (—Graffitist C)

Figure 2. **Main type of activity of respondents by age group (N=184).**



Now we can focus on painting

Finding a place

More than half (55%) of the respondents started using the Suvilahti graffiti walls in 2009 when the walls were opened. Altogether 75% of the respondents had started using them during the first two years. In 2011, the opportunity to create graffiti was extended to the Kalasatama area. After that happened, 90% of respondents were practising graffiti in the area. The remaining 10% started to paint on the area's graffiti walls in 2012. As regards the adoption of the walls by age group, it seems that the older the respondent was, the earlier he/she adopted the place. This phenomenon is particularly noticeable in the first year of operation, 2009, when about 75% of the older age group (36–40) adopted the place, whilst only about 20% of the minors did. The primary source of information on the existence of the graffiti fences at Suvilahti and Kalasatama has been friends, and 80% of the respondents said that they had received the information from friends. 9% said that they had read about the walls in a newspaper, and more than 11% mentioned other sources, such as online discussion forums, a local painting accessory store or just stumbling across the sites by chance.

Reasons for using the walls

The most popular reasons for using graffiti walls were as a hobby (70%) and a way of spending free time (63%). It is quite natural for the themes of free time and hobby to be linked and appear together, but in this case the different responses can be interpreted as indicating differences of emphasis in devoting oneself to the graffiti pastime: creating graffiti can be viewed seriously as a hobby that takes a great deal of time or more lightly as just a way of spending time. According to an enthusiast, *it is a question of spending time or practising a hobby, all the way to a life style.* In terms of legal graffiti, the motives of enthusiasts identified by Moisio (2013, 81) can be interpreted in the content of the responses 'free time' and 'hobby' – namely the need for self-expression, self-development and a feeling of freedom. A feeling of freedom is expressed, as experiences in escaping the daily grind, finding peace and having your own time to spend. One graffitist said that *graffiti is a hobby just like any other.*

Almost half the respondents gave the atmosphere of the place as their reason for painting on the graffiti walls and 40% said that it was because of friends. In discussions, atmosphere and friends as a reason for using the place could be summed up as a milieu that seems special – a place where you can just be in peace. *It's nice to gather here with friends, joke around, listen to music and paint.* Somewhat surprisingly, the traditional quest for respect in the graffiti culture was not high on the list of reasons for using the graffiti walls (15%). Neither did professional reasons (10%) figure highly as a reason for painting. 8% of respondents gave other reasons for using the place such as a empowering form of expression or a life style.

Figure 3. **Reasons given by respondents for painting on legal graffiti walls (N=184).**



Painting activity

Based on the level of painting activity, three distinct user groups are evident: major users who paint four to eight times a month or even more (21%), basic enthusiasts who paint once or twice a month (47%), and those occasional



▶ Painting and passers-by at Suvilahti graffiti fence.

▶ Graffitists paint on the graffiti fences and walls all year round.

experimenters who paint one to four times a year or just come to soak in the atmosphere (32%). This last group also includes people from out of town: *I come here once every three months, but I paint once a week on a wall near where I live.* Of all the paintings done in the area, about 60% were done by major users. With regard to major users, it can be generally said that the more often a person paints on the walls, the older he/she is.

Painting times

Almost all the respondents (98%) said that they paint in the warm season between May and August. It is significant that about 40% of respondents said that they paint all year round. About 75% paint every day of the week, 20% only at weekends and 5% only on weekdays. Approximately 85% of respondents mainly paint on the walls when it is light, i.e. during the time between midday and 6 pm. 60% also paint in the evenings between 6 pm and midnight, and 30% paint at night. According to one active graffitist:

I paint on the walls at all times of the year and at any time of the day or night. Because of my work, I paint more at the weekends, when I can see more of my friends too. During the week, work and other hobbies get in the way of this one. Some people also come to the walls during working days. Usually I set off for the walls first thing in the morning. Now that you can really focus on painting there, you can go there late at night. (—Graffitist D)

A typical painting session lasts from two to four hours for half of the respondents (50%). More than one-third (34%) paint from four to six hours. 74% of respondents said that, even when they are not painting, they still spend time in the areas of Suvilahti and Kalasatama.

Costs of use

When they paint, almost half (46%) of respondents use six to ten different colours, i.e. spray cans. Since the price of one can is about €4, the costs of an individual painting session can vary between €24 and €40. This gives an average cost of €32 for one session. For the group using the least number of colours, the cost of a single session is less than €20 and the costs for those using the most colours can be anything from €60 to €100.

A social thing

The use of the graffiti walls is a social thing (Felisbret 2009, 180–182). Almost all the respondents (99%) said that they paint graffiti with friends. The respondents are divided into two groups of almost the same size. The smaller half (45%) said that they paint only with friends and the larger half (55%) paint sometimes alone and sometimes with friends. More than 70% of respondents said that they have made new friends from painting graffiti. An experienced graffitist said:

Painting graffiti is a social event and for me those afternoons are definitely a social thing; music, a couple of beers and friends. On the other hand, at the same time there are many guys at the wall scratching and painting and they don't say much to each other. But that's because it's been planned in advance: what to do, coordinated colours and perhaps a uniform background. Then we spend hours there together. It's a bit like a picnic. Then we've been able to do stuff like going to sauna together. (—Graffitist E)

Target groups

On the graffiti walls, people do paintings mainly for themselves (72%) and for everyone in the city (46%). Creating graffiti for oneself indicates the competitive development of the aesthetic arts and the personal reputations of the artists. The graffitist wants to do *good work, improving all the time.* At the Suvilahti and Kalasatama graffiti walls one of the key audiences of the artists appears to be everyone in the city, that is, total strangers (Macdonald 2001, 64–65), people whom the artist is not necessarily ever going to meet personally. As one enthusiast reflected: *Graffiti is communication with the rest of the world.* (cf. Gastman & Neelon 2011, 31; Stewart 2009, 151). On the other hand, at the graffiti walls the

Figure 4. Target groups for graffiti paintings done by respondents (N=185).



idea of a complete stranger is diluted in places as a face-to-face meeting. According to one graffitist, *sure, at the wall there's always someone coming to ask about graffiti painting, and I always try to answer*. About 15% of respondents take notice of random passers-by in the area as they do their paintings.

Graffiti is also done for friends (34%) and other graffitists (28%). Graffiti targeted at friends and other graffiti artists can be seen as a situation in which the artists are communicating with each other, for example by challenging each other in terms of skill or by surprising each other visually (Ferrell 2009, 23–24). At the same time, the graffitists articulate the inner order of the graffiti community. In the view of one graffitist:

I paint graffiti for myself and for my mates. Not necessarily for your average man on the street. They don't necessarily understand these letters. They just see some nice colours. Graffiti can be done for everyone if you do different things, things that make a statement about something. You get feedback from your mates; we think about how we've developed, be it good or bad. (—Graffitist D)

SOMEWHAT SURPRISINGLY, in this survey only about 10% of respondents said that they paint graffiti to be photographed for online communities, even though the rapid turnover of paintings on the graffiti walls and their documentation might actually require the recording of the works and their distribution in photographic form. 5% of respondents also mentioned other target groups. They specifically mentioned all citizens or just 'everyone'. More individualised work was shown to role models or to close friends.

Opinions on legal graffiti

Almost 80% of respondents engaged in legal graffiti reckoned – given the two answer options of yes or no – that authorised graffiti prevents vandalism.[3] The pro and con arguments about the effect of legal graffiti sites can be presented as follows:

1. Legal graffiti sites strengthen the graffiti culture centred on illegal work because, at authorised walls, you can practise creating graffiti for illegal places: *You can think that people's enthusiasm isn't limited just to painting on those legal walls, so it might increase the amount of graffiti. On the other hand, I believe that when there are such walls, they offer more people opportunities to create for themselves. It might be that legal walls become a totally normal way to paint graffiti. (—Graffitist E)*

2. Legal graffiti sites change the traditional graffiti culture centred around illegal work, because each can of spray paint used on authorised graffiti walls is then not available for illegal places: *A legal graffiti site doesn't increase the amount of illegal graffiti. On the contrary, it reduces it. Even those for whom illegal graffiti is important go there to do their stuff. Then the need to do something elsewhere declines. (—Graffitist F)*

3) Vandalism is all kinds of behaviour that violates good practices in a public place. As a more concise concept, malicious damage is the illegal destruction, damage, desecration, soiling or breaking of all private or public property.

To the second question on opinions – should the City of Helsinki continue to organise authorised graffiti wall activity? – respondents stated almost unanimously (99%) that authorised graffiti activity should continue to be organised. One artist evaluated the change in culture caused by the graffiti walls as follows:

Because of the graffiti walls, graffiti is no longer a subculture. You can say that hardcore illegal graffiti is a subculture, but this graffiti done in Suvilahti is not like that, although it is not any mainstream thing either. (—Graffitist B)

Graffiti in the light of day

Helsinki's first authorised graffiti walls are based on a change that took place in the city's graffiti policy. The graffiti walls located in the Suvilahti and Kalasatama areas can be called an operating model focused on the large-scale and temporary painting of graffiti, as a result of which graffiti artists have become a significant part of the area's users. The operating model focused on graffiti painting created opportunities for the creation of an ethnographic survey. The key results of the survey are as follows:

THE PRACTISING OF GRAFFITI can no longer unequivocally be considered a phenomenon of youth culture, as the average age of enthusiasts is about 30, and the wide age range means that graffiti painting is not something people do when they are young (cf. Kramer 2010, 245). Secondly, the graffiti walls have artists from every decade of the graffiti history of Helsinki. This result indicates that graffiti walls have concentrated the practice of the pastime, and they have also been used by graffitists who had previously done illegal graffiti. Moreover, the effect of the 'Stop töhryille' project on preventing people from starting to create graffiti has been slight. Thirdly, according to their main occupation, more than 80% of respondents are engaged in paid employment, are students or entrepreneurs. Based on this result, simplified images of characterising graffitists as people on the margin of society can be considered questionable. Furthermore, 'hobby' or 'free time' were the main reasons given for using the graffiti walls, and the main target groups were the graffitists themselves and everyone in the city. This indicates that creating authorised graffiti in a public place has changed the orientation of the subculture of graffiti artists (cf. Macdonald 2001, 90; Kramer 2010, 243). Graffitists almost unanimously want authorised graffiti sites to be continued.

THE RESULTS OF THE ETHNOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE confirm the idea that the authorised graffiti walls at Suvilahti and Kalasatama and their users and use are part of the local continuum of the New York graffiti-based phenomenon that has existed in Helsinki for 30 years. The present graffiti phenomenon has socially diversified so that, as an overall group, placing graffitists in the categories of crime or youth culture is no longer possible (cf. McAuliffe 2013, 522). In the present situation, high-quality authorised graffiti work can be called an artistic hobby which, as a means of producing urban space, can create for a place new levels of meaning and improve its atmosphere and attractiveness. (cf. Wacławek 2011, 114; Zukin & Braslow 2011, 133–

138; Jacobs 1992/1961, 34–37). In Suvilahti and Kalasatama, the use of legal graffiti sites has woven together into a social relationship urban space planning, graffiti performance and the experience of art.

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Helsinki as a capital city

MATTI KLINGE

▶ Helsinki celebrated its bicentenary as the capital of Finland in 2012. Pääkaupunki: Helsinki ja Suomen valtio 1808–1863 (The Capital City: Helsinki and the Finnish State 1808–1863) by Professor Emeritus Matti Klinge is one of the historical studies published by the City to commemorate the event.

— MATTI KLINGE *is Professor Emeritus of History at University of Helsinki.*

HELSINKI WAS FOUNDED IN 1550 BY STATE DECREE and its most important characteristic has ever since been a close relationship to the state. The foundation of Helsinki was prompted by the commercial interest of the Swedish realm, and the aim was to make the city large and mighty – even though this entailed that burghers from other towns were ordered by the King to move to Helsinki. That particular project failed, but Helsinki survived and eventually thrived in the 17th century as an important transfer port for troops, horses and supplies for the long wars in Livonia and Poland (as shown by Seppo Aalto in his book Sotakaupunki, 'The War City').

IN THE FOLLOWING CENTURY WHEN RUSSIA HAD, after territorial conquests in 1710–1714 and the peace treaty of Uusikaupunki in 1721, become a powerful state in the Baltic Sea region and master of the southeast and southern shores of the Gulf of Finland, Helsinki became significant for Swedish war strategy. The motive of the Government was defence against Russian expansion but, even more importantly, a desire of revenge: to take back provinces lost to Russia (Karelia, Ingria, Estonia and Livonia). Sweden had also wider ambitions, together with Turkey, which attacked Russia from the south. The most important manifestation of these plans was Viapori (Swedish: Sveaborg, later in Finnish: Suomenlinna), a large coastal fortress complex built in

1748 and onwards with important financial contributions from France. The construction project – which would have seemed rather grandiose at the time, or in any time – was an enormous investment part of which benefited the merchants and other inhabitants of Helsinki. Once again, Helsinki was dependent on the large projects of the state.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE STATE TO HELSINKI reached its peak in the early 19th century when Russia had conquered the territory of Finland and formed a new autonomous state, the Grand Duchy of Finland, within the Russian Empire. Finland became a military security zone for Russia and its capital Saint Petersburg. Several garrisons were set up in Finland, and its most important military establishment was Viapori (albeit the Bomarsund fortress in the Åland Islands was of similar importance, but only for a short while). The fortresses and garrisons functioned directly under Russia's state administration, whilst civilian matters were delegated to administrative bodies specific to the Grand Duchy, together with the sovereign in Saint Petersburg.

THE QUESTION OF A CAPITAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE CITY was first discussed at the Porvoo diet in 1809, and already at an early stage, certain groups saw Helsinki as a potential monument for Alexander I, the conqueror and benefactor of Finland, and even proposed renaming Helsinki 'Alexandria'. Only in 1812, when Russia and Sweden had reached agreement on the stableness of the common borders and on the existence of the Grand Duchy of Finland, was the Emperor ready to decree, on 8 April 1812, that Finland would have a capital of its own and that this status would be given to Helsinki. The decision was influenced by count G.M. Armfelt, the chargé d'affaires for matters concerning Finland.

HELSINKI WAS THE BEST ALTERNATIVE FOR THREE REASONS. For one thing, its position along the Gulf of Finland was unique both militarily and commercially in the sense that it had a large and deep roadstead, the Kruunuvuorenselkä, sheltered from storms by Viapori and other islands; and at the same time it had fast access to the open sea. A great asset was, of course, the fortress itself which, in turn, needed the merchant town for its provisioning. Another reason was that in autumn 1808, a fire had devastated much of the city, which would in any case have to be rebuilt and made representative again. A third, ideological factor important to Armfelt himself was that Finland should have a new centre releasing it from the historical ties to Sweden and also expressing and construing in every way the new statehood. Finland's largest town in those days (before the great fire in 1827) was Turku, but it was crowded and labyrinth-like and could not be transformed into a monumental, symbolically important city. Moreover, the general atmosphere in Turku was conservative in favour of the traditions and rights of the Swedish rule.



City plan by J.A. Ehrenström, 1820, detail. Anders Kocke. Helsinki City Archives.



▶ **Governor-General's Palace, C. L. Engel. National Board of Public Buildings / National Archives.**

THE DECISION IN 1812 LED TO a completely new kind of town planning under the direction of Councillor of State J.A. Ehrenström, who had been appointed the leading planner of Helsinki. Armfelt and his successors managed to acquire the financial means for the implementation of the plans by stretching the budget of the Grand Duchy to its limits. In accordance with Ehrenström's plan, a square pattern with very wide streets and large squares was blasted into the rocky terrain of Helsinki. In the only valley of this headland stretching out into the outer archipelago, a boulevard, the Esplanadi-Bulevardi stretch, was planted. With the exception of Berlin and Milan, it had almost no precedent in the Europe of that day. It took hundreds and hundreds of barrow, cart and sledge loads of landfill to turn the partly shallow and muddy bay off the town – still in its natural state – into an enormous, entirely paved Market Square reaching out into deep water. The draining and filling of Kluuvinlahti bay where the Rautatientori (Railway Square) was subsequently built would not be completed until decades later.

EHRENSTRÖM SKETCHED AN EMPEROR'S RESIDENCE to provide a large symbolic building for Helsinki, much the same as the Royal Palace in Stockholm. It would have stood in the Kruununhaka district behind the present-day Meritullintori square, with a large 'palace square' and an extensive park in the whereabouts of present Säätytalo (House of the Estates) square. Following the overall change in European politics in 1819, no monumental residence was ever built in Helsinki, because the Emperor did not intend to stay in Helsinki other than occasionally. Thereby the importance of another square grew – the Senate Square, which was already being paved on the grounds of the old Suurtori ('Great Square'). As early as the mid-1820s, the Ulrika Church was moved from the Senate Square to its current Bulevardi location, and in the late 1820s, the main building of the University (transferred in 1828 from Turku) began to rise as a counterpoise to the Senate Building across the Senate Square. Thus the Senate Square came to assume the role of a monumental centre. In 1830, the decision was made to start building the St Nicholas Church as the ideological, architectural and optical focus of the square. The work on the foundations of the church was very demanding, but it would become (instead of the Emperor's Residence that was never built) Helsinki's largest and most spectacular building and a symbol for the city.

THE SENATE SQUARE THUS BECAME the concretisation of the central administration, the spiritual being and the identity of the Grand Duchy of Finland – and the State of Finland – and it was symbolically presided over by the church.

IN THE MILIEU OF THE UNIVERSITY, an ideology of Finnish identity sprung forth from intellectuals like Runeberg, Lönnrot, Snellman, F. Cygnaeus and Topelius. This ideology was spread throughout Finland by graduates from the university, and a vibrant printed press took shape in Helsinki. Meanwhile, Turku was still very important for commerce and journalism, but certain political developments in the 1860s decisively consolidated Helsinki's leading position. The first regular session of the Diet of Finland in 1863 was opened in Helsinki by the Emperor Alexander II in person. Another important reform was the railway policy of the same Emperor, which made Helsinki (and Saint Petersburg) the focal point of the Finnish railway network.

THUS AT FIRST, THE AIM WAS TO construct Helsinki not only as a monument for Emperor Alexander but above all the symbol of an entirely new Finnish state and nation. The grandiosity of the city plan was worthily complemented by the monumental buildings designed by architect C.L. Engel; garrisons, churches, Senate Palace and Governor-General's Palace, and the Main Building of the University with many adherent buildings including a very elegant large library. The example of the uniformly Classicist architecture of the public buildings was followed in every way in private construction of stone and wooden houses.

HELSINKI BOTH EXPRESSED AND CREATED at first Finland's statehood and later its national-ideological existence. Finland became a centralised state where the leadership of administration, education, politics and, gradually, trade and industry was concentrated in Helsinki. When the Russian Revolution separated Finland from the Russian Empire, the highest political leadership moved to Helsinki in 1917–1918. The armistice of 1944 further increased Helsinki's importance, since Viipuri, the biggest city in Eastern Finland, remained behind the new border, and Helsinki inherited a large proportion of its sphere of influence. Not many countries comparable with Finland experienced this kind of concentration of influence and power. Helsinki's position with regard to the whole country is exceptionally central and all-encompassing.

Cities in a Globalizing World





” For too long many urban researchers have been locked in narrow debates often focused on a locality or region, at best country, which frequently lack a comparative dimension and take little notice of interactions with the world outside their region or country.

IN FEBRUARY 2013 OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS published the Oxford Handbook of Cities in World History, a book which I had worked on and edited over the previous three or so years, aided by Professor Lynn Lees of the University of Philadelphia, a leading expert on modern cities, and Prof. David Mattingley, equally well known for his studies of the ancient city.

THE NEED FOR A BOOK of this kind is clear. For too long many urban researchers have been locked in narrow debates often focused on a locality or region, at best country, which frequently lack a comparative dimension and take little notice of interactions with the world outside their region or country. It is self-evident that in the early 21st century, with urbanization becoming a global phenomenon, this kind of pre-Galilean mentality is no longer meaningful. The Oxford Handbook is an attempt to provide the first large-scale global framework for historical urban studies through the collective work of an international team including leading Finnish scholars (Marjatta Hietala, Jussi Jauhiainen, Hannu Salmi), as well as American, European and British researchers.

THE BOOK IS 900 PAGES LONG and has 50 contributors from the fields of urban history, ancient history, archaeology, architectural history, sociology and political science. It examines from a comparative perspective urban developments across the world from the origin of cities to the present day. The book is divided into three parts: Early Cities; Pre-Modern Cities; and Modern and Contemporary Developments. Each part contains regional surveys of the main urban systems in the world, including Europe, the Americas, Africa, China, Japan and South and South East Asia, as well as thematic chapters comparing key variables in urban development (for example, power, migration and population, culture and representations, urban creativity, suburbanization, economic growth).

IN THIS SHORT PAPER I want to discuss the constraints of editing a comparative volume of this type, then the challenges (and opportunities!), and finally (and briefly) some of the main findings of this exciting enterprise.

— **PETER CLARK** *is Professor Emeritus of European Urban History at University of Helsinki.*

When I took on the commission to edit this book from OUP, I told the commissioning editor that this was the riskiest publishing project I had ever been involved in! What I meant was that it involved a large group of scholars, largely unknown to one another, from diverse disciplines, working on a wide variety of periods and themes, in order to attempt to construct the first wide-ranging comparative survey and analysis of the world's urban development from ancient times to the present. Not an easy mission! There were from the start a number of constraints. Firstly the publisher had a rather rigid view of the series format and the size of the volume – ideas for adding new chapters involved dropping others. Even though the final volume was bigger than Oxford University Press had wanted, still there was no way the collection could ever be comprehensive. In contrast to earlier times when publishers had helped underwrite the organizational costs of large collective ventures, there was no financial support from the press. So we had to fund almost everything ourselves!

> "**I became aware** that quite a number of scholars are not really interested in comparative history of the transoceanic variety: they prefer their own smaller lagoons, even shallows, of research."

Thus there was the related difficulty of raising the money needed for the preparation of this elaborate volume, including the two planning conferences in Helsinki University in May 2010 and at the University of Pennsylvania in April 2011, together with the costs of copyrights and images. Research funding bodies talk a good deal about supporting comparative interdisciplinary projects and even global research, but the rhetoric is often more positive than the funding outcomes. However I am delighted to say that both the University of Helsinki and the City of Helsinki (notably Asta Manninen and Urban Facts), as well as the Ella and Georg Ehrnrooth Foundation, the Federation of Finnish Learned Societies (TVS), and the Royal Embassy of the Netherlands in Finland gave important support for the work on the volume.

Most striking was that when I first contacted people to take part in this work I became aware that quite a number of scholars are not really interested in comparative history of the transoceanic variety: they prefer their own smaller lagoons, even shallows, of research. In fact in one or two major areas I wrote to a good number of people without any response at all. Nevertheless what proved both inspiring and humbling about the project was that those colleagues, young and old, who did agree to join the enterprise were remarkably enthusiastic, engaged, open to dialogue, and responsive to our tight schedule. I take my hat off especially to those authors who took on the challenge of writing the comparative thematic chapters, real path-breaking efforts, though a good number of the survey chapters also have important comparative perspectives. It has indeed been a real voyage of discovery for almost all of the authors!

What were the challenges? One clearly was to construct a completely new international network of scholars. Although urban studies have flourished across the world in the last few decades, research networks have been fragmented and divided with little communication between them. In our project, for the first time, Europeanists, Africanists, scholars of North America, Latin America, East Asia and so on, were involved in intensive and wide-ranging debate and discussion which undoubtedly informed and improved the final publication.

Another important challenge was to create a structured, joined up history of global urban development from early times to the present day, to pursue key questions and arguments across different urban systems, to clarify some of the issues about the interconnectivity and interactions of cities across the world in the era before contemporary globalization. We were not interested in simply producing an encyclopedia of articles. A structured approach was adopted to ensure most major regions and themes were explored in detail, rather than a kind of pick and mix approach, privileging one or two particular themes or just big and famous cities. A further challenge of course was to bring the book in on schedule to a high standard without having a mutiny of contributors! Here the very successful conferences we held in Helsinki and Philadelphia played an important part, mobilizing the commitment of contributors and revealing where authors might face difficulties in meeting the schedule or publication standards. But the strong capacity of the editorial team was also influential in producing the final outcome.

> "**It comes** as a salutary surprise to discover that for much of the pre-modern period Asia and Middle Eastern cities were often bigger, more sophisticated, more continuously dynamic than their European counterparts."

What are the principal findings of this large collective work? No doubt readers will have their own views reflecting their own perspective and interests. But it seems to me that a number of general conclusions are evident. First, the trope of globalization which so dominates contemporary debates has a long pre-history: that international interactions between urban systems in East and West certainly were important by the Middle Ages and were probably significant already during the ancient era. Trade between Europe, the Middle East and both China and India affected the fortunes of major port cities and inland entrepôts across the world, not just in Europe, from the 13th century if not before. Up to the 17th century at least, European cities were often the poor relation in the intercontinental traffic between Asia and the Middle East. Second, it comes as a salutary surprise to discover that for much of the pre-modern period Asia and Middle Eastern cities were often bigger, more sophisticated, more continuously dynamic than their European counterparts. Kaifeng in China had perhaps 1.4 million inhabitants in the 11th century, Hangzhou around a million in the 13th century, Baghdad above 600,000 in the 11th century, Cairo 270,000 around 1400, at a time when the biggest European cities probably did not much exceed 200,000; again Edo (Tokyo) had around one million c. 1700, well ahead of the largest Western city at that time, London. A third general conclusion is that the rise of the European city is recent. Only from the later 18th century do we see the First Great Divergence: urbanization rates accelerate in the West powered by industrialization, global trade, high finance, and powerful militarized nation states in Europe; whilst cities largely stagnate in Asia, the Middle East and Latin America. One consequence was a proliferation of European (and American) colonial cities across Africa, the Middle East and Asia. But this ascendancy has proven short-lived. Since the 1980s a Second Great Divergence has occurred. Whilst European urbanization has stabilized, Asian and Latin American cities have grown rapidly, with the great majority of the world's largest cities now located outside this continent. As we know, from the problems of Nokia, economic competition from Asia has had a major impact on urban industries in the West. Finally, the new comparative material should encourage us to review and revise some of the key concepts that Western scholars have stressed – such as municipalism, and civil society, to mention just two – in their discussion of urban development over time.

NEEDLESS TO SAY, there is much more work to be done on a global analysis of city history in the past! This book is only the start, a launch pad for fresh and no doubt diverse discourses, for an ongoing debate about the role, impact and interaction of cities in world history. Here the Oxford Handbook may serve, also, as an important resource for global urban history, providing key data, outlines and literature references.

WHAT I SEE AS CRUCIAL FOR FUTURE ANALYSIS are two points. One: comparative material should enable us to see much more clearly what is distinctive about urban systems in our region, and what features are shared, common, to all urban societies. Secondly it should help illuminate what the key drivers of change are – the structural pressures of urbanization, interconnectivity, competition and emulation, and so on. If this book is to have any impact it will surely mean that studying cities or regional urban systems in glorious isolation is on the way out.

PEKKA KAIKKONEN

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